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Abstract
In the transition of the Process Handbook' from a single user application to a multi-user server, the
issue of controlling the user access privileges has to be addressed. This thesis aims at establishing
an efficient and flexible access control policy to regulate the usage as well as to increase flexibility
for collaboration in the multi-user Handbook. In this thesis, a proposed access control policy,
within the Process Handbook object API abstraction level, will be identified. Moreover, desirable
changes in the server to complement the new access control policy will be suggested.
As a result of the research, groups of users can more easily control the design of processes
relationships. While new forms of collaboration are made possible, users can view the entities
stored in the Process Handbook from new perspectives. Moreover, unexpected alterations of
information stored in the system can be reduced.
Thesis Supervisor : Thomas W. Malone
Supervisor's Title : Patrick J. McGovern Professor of Information Systems
1Process Handbook is developed at the Center for Coordination Science in the Process Handbook Project
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The Process Handbook developed at the Center of Coordination Science has reached a stage to
move from a single-user application to a multi-user collaborative system. While the range of
functionality has increased substantially, numerous problems have evolved. In particular, there are
the issues of access control, authentication, concurrency control, and user-interface semantic
model. This research will attempt to address the specific issues relating to access control. Through
the comparisons of different possible models of controlling access, the optimal policy, within the
object API abstraction level, would be identified. Finally, any desirable changes in the server
objects to complement the new access control policy would be suggested.
1.1 Motivation
Controlling access can provide the Process Handbook users with security and flexibility. As a
result, proprietary and sensitive information in the Process Handbook can be protected. Moreover,
information under construction can be made hidden from irrelevant users. Finally, users can
incrementally disclose changes made to the handbook, taking advantage of new forms of
collaboration available.
1.1.1 Protection and Hiding of Information
The presence of naive or malicious users in the Process Handbook imposes serious threats to the
stored information. Therefore, controlling the access of information becomes vital. In addition,
with access control in place, information under construction can be hidden from users by granting
read access to the relevant users alone.
In the Process Handbook, activities are organized into multiple hierarchies. In each hierarchy,
inheritance allows the attributes of high level activities to be propagated down to lower levels. As
modifying a high level activity affects all its descendants, the characteristics of high level activities
should not be easily modifiable. Similarly, low level activities, especially in the specialization
hierarchy, may be proprietary. As a result, such information should only be readable to a
restricted set of users. Finally, processes in their initial specification stage, such as in the scratch
areas, are often useful to their authors alone. Therefore, by hiding information under construction,
users can benefit from a cleaner view of the information in the Process Handbook. Hence, because
of the need to protect and to hide information in the Process Handbook, an access control policy is
highly desired.
To further demonstrate the importance of controlling accesses in the Process Handbook, consider
the situation where the access of information is unregulated. In such situation, a naive or malicious
user can not only modify information, but also delete it; hence, the operations of normal users in
the handbook are seriously affected. Without a regulated environment, the normal users would not
find the system able to satisfy their needs. Hence, the usefulness of the system would be
tremendously affected. Again, the need for a secure regulated environment is definite.
1.1.2 Empowerment of Control
When multiple users are collaborating in the specification of a new process, they may prefer to
delay exposing the new process to the public because many changes may occur before reaching its
final version. In addition, an author of the process may want to collaborate with a different set of
users during different stages. By extending the Process Handbook with a rich access control
policy, such flexibility in controlling the development of information can be accomplished.
Development often comes in stages. By providing the flexibility of controlling the access of
information, the Process Handbook provides a natural environment where users can control the
development of processes by designating different access restrictions during different stages of the
development process. For example, in stage I, an author may be trying out new ideas in his
scratch area. Then, he may invite his partner company to review his design in stage II.
Afterwards, the author may put the new information to test by requesting the comments of a
restricted group of users. Finally, when fully matured, the information may be made open to the
public in the final stage. With a rich access control model in the Process Handbook, the above
scenario would become feasible. As a result, users can benefit from having a development
environment tailored to their own needs.
Table 1: Design Objectives
Objective Description
Flexibility Empower users to control the development and maintenance of processes
Protection Provide appropriate protection to different types of information
Efficiency The time and space required for access control should be relatively small.
Scalability As the number of users or the amount of information grows, efficiency should
not be significantly affected.
1.2 Goal
With the integration of an access control policy, the Process Handbook should offer an increase in
the flexibility of collaboration as well as a solid protection of the stored information. As a result of
the increase in flexibility, users are empowered to flexibly control the development and
maintenance of processes. Moreover, because of the increase in the level of protection, proprietary
and sensitive information will not be available to non-authorized users. However, to be a secure
information system; the Process handbook should also satisfy the following properties, as defined
in "Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria" [10]:
* Confidentiality : Protection of unauthorized access of information
* Integrity : Protection of unauthorized changes of information
* Availability : Protection of unauthorized withholding of information
Moreover, in the design of the access control mechanism, performance issues such as efficiency
and scalability also arise. In particular, to be efficient, the time and space required for access
control should be insignificant. As importantly, as the number of users and the amount of stored
information increase, the efficiency of the system should not be significantly affected. Finally, the
design of the control model should be simple for the ease of system maintenance. A summary of
the design objectives is listed inTable 1.
1.3 Scope of Research
To fully protect information stored in the Process Handbook, other mechanisms are needed in
addition to access control. In particular, an authentication scheme must be used to verify the
identities of users. Moreover, the computer on which the Process Handbook resides must be
protected from attacks. In a network environment, messages sent among computers can be
intercepted, modified, or even replaced. Hence, a secure message exchange protocol would also be
required.
In this research, most of the attention is directed towards the use of access control. Specifically, an
access control mechanism will be implemented within the object API abstraction level. Moreover,
this research will investigate the rules concerning how the access control policy regulates the
inheritance of information, and what modifications are desirable in the API objects. Finally,
mechanisms for establishing secure channels and for authentication will also be addressed.
it of access control policies will be
sms available for implementing the
els and server authentication can be
I and the Message Digest algorithm
loordination Science to facilitate the
:ollecting examples of how different
n present the relative advantages of
n compare the activities currently in
rovement.
encies, resources, ports, as well as
ities, various kinds of relations are
he super-class collects the common
, which implies the description of
vity "deliver sub-component" can be
package sub-component", and "ship
other, and this kind of interaction is
, activities may be dependent on
they have a producer/consumer
nstraint [1]. On the other hand,
ning a dependency coordination
id dependencies is accomplished
nnected with one another [20].
lations of activities. In this figure,
ig "Identify prospects" and "Inform
d into more focused activities like
alized activities automatically inherit
xduct". Nevertheless, decomposition
For example, in "direct mail sales",
ice "Identify Prospects". Moreover,
sts" with "Inform prospects about
L~.
a
·4
;rI
·a
.a 3
a
.4
c IIUI::la: q.a
P,
·) n
cr
WIEI~
U
0)
n
Figure 1: Interaction of specializations, decompositions, and dependencies. Adapted from
(Malone, et. al, 1993)
d'
s8
m 4 .Z Q
B Q
I P:
-4
While the Process Handbook is currently a single-user system, it is being extended to become a
multi-user system. Nevertheless, in its transition to a multi-user system, numerous issues have to
be addressed, as described in the previous section.
2.2 Access Control Policies
As stated by Brinkley and Schell [4], access control policies can be partitioned into two main
categories: mandatory access control policy and discretionary access control policy. Each of them
is described below:
In a mandatory access control policy, the sensitivity of objects and the users of the system are
partitioned into access classes. When a user creates an object, the sensitivity of the object would
be marked the same as that of the user. As a result, only users with the same or a more superior
access class can access the object. In this way, the flow of information from one access class to
another could be restricted.
To achieve the control over the flow of information, a mandatory access control policy must be
both global and persistent [4]. In particular, when an access control policy is both global and
persistent, all objects in the system would have the same level of sensitivity wherever they are and
whenever it is. To achieve these properties, the set of access classes must form a partial order set
[4]. In other words, for any pairs of access classes, class A and class B, they must fall into one of
three cases: A is superior to class B, class B is superior to class A, or class A and B are not
comparable.
Because the access class labels are attached to the objects in the system and that the labels are
global and persistent, no one can pass information to users of an unauthorized access class. As a
result, a mandatory access control policy provides a high assurance of protection to the information
in the system, even in the face of Trojan horses and other forms of malicious software.
While the mandatory policy employs a simple strict rule to restrict access, given the characteristics
of the Process Handbook, the discretionary access control policy provides a better match. (For
further discussions, see Section 3.1) In a discretionary access control policy, the restriction on the
flow of information is much less severe. Unlike a mandatory access policy where an object created
by a user could only be viewed by others of the same access class, a discretionary access control
policy would allow users to designate the permissions given to others in the system.
2.3 Access Control for Inherited Information
In an object-oriented system, security should be defined at the level of the object model [11].
While it is possible to provide security through lower level operations, this approach violates a
basic principle for the design of secure system, i.e., access restrictions should be defined at the
highest possible level where the semantics are explicit [13]. Therefore, regulations should be
applied to the usage of defined object methods.
Moreover, the hierarchical structure of classes and sub-classes can be used to define implied access
to avoid the proliferation of rules [11]. Fernandez, Larrondo-Petrie, and Gudes [11] propose the
following rules for implied access in inheritance:
2.3.1 Rules for Generalization:
* Implied authorization: a user that is authorized to apply a given method to a class has the
same right with respect to the corresponding inherited method in a subclass of that class.
* Class access: access to a complete class implies the right to apply all the methods defined
in the class as well as methods inherited from higher classes.
* Visibility: the use of methods defined in a subclass is not implied by the right to use the
methods in a super-class of this class. This also applies to the redefinition of inherited
methods.
* Propagation control for specialization: the propagation of an inherited authorization for a
method can be stopped by a rule specifying no access (negative authorization) to that
specific method.
2.3.2 Rules for Aggregation:
* Propagation: access to a class only implies similar type of access for the components of the
class if this type of access normally propagates to these components.
* Composite objects: access to all methods of a class implies the right to apply any methods
in the component classes.
* Propagation control for aggregation: a negative authorization rule can stop the propagation
of implied access in aggregation.
2.3.3 Rules for Relationships
* Relationship inheritance: access to a relationship or to some of its attributes can be
inherited with the specific restrictions implied by the subclass.
* Propagation control for relationship: propagation of inheritance in generalization
relationships can be stopped by using negative authorization rules.
2.3.1 Process-oriented Access Control
Unlike traditional object-oriented systems where the systems are organized around objects, the
Process Handbook is composed of processes. Processes and objects differ in certain aspects; for
example, while inheritance applies to only nouns in the object-oriented world, inheritance applies to
both verbs and nouns in the process-oriented world. However, similar to objects, processes are
interrelated with one another through specialization, decomposition, and other relationships.
Because of the similar types of inheritance relationship exhibited among objects and processes, the
above ideas regarding the rules for regulating generalization, aggregation, and relationships can be
heavily drawn upon so that the access control policy could take advantage of the inheritance
relationship of processes. Moreover, it is clear that both the normal propagation of access, and the
usage of negative authorization rules are applicable to the Process Handbook. In particular, as
processes become increasingly specialized, they are more likely to become sensitive information for
specific users. Therefore, the ability to view a high-level process in a hierarchy should not imply
the ability to view its descendants. In other relationships, the author may desire similar types of
control to restrict access. Therefore, the propagation control for specialization, decomposition, and
relationships, together with the normal propagation rules, provide the flexibility to meet a wide
range of requirements.
2.4 Implementation of Access Control Policy
Clark and Redell [8] suggest that the mechanisms that are practical for implementing access
control policy fall into three categories: access control lists, capabilities, and their hybrid [8]. Each
of them will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
2.4.1 Access control lists
In access control lists, each domain2 in the system would maintain a list which identifies the
permissions given to different users of the system. A typical access control list would be composed
of two columns. While first column identifies the users, the second column includes the access
privileges given to the corresponding users. Using the access control list mechanism, the system
can easily keep track of the privileges given to users. However, the system has to search through
the list during each access, making efficiency a concern.
In changing the content of an access control list, a system can either use the self-control approach
or the hierarchical-control approach [9]. In the self-control approach, the user who created an
object would be given the permission to modify its access control list. On the other hand, in the
hierarchical-approach, the access control lists are organized in a hierarchical manner, and the
administrator of the high level access control lists would also be permitted to modify the lists in
lower levels. In this way, high level administrators can take care of low level lists in cases where
the low level administrators are unavailable, or mistakes have been made. However, under the
hierarchical scheme, the high level administrators would become too powerful. To create a balance
of power, suggestions have been made to create an audit trail to keep track of access-control-list
modifications. Another possible solution is to support a buddy system which allows modifications
only if multiple authorized users have performed the same operations.
2 Domain: A domain is made up of one or more objects in the system
2.4.2 Capabilities
In capabilities, each authorized user of a domain is given a capability which the user can use in
subsequent access. A typical capability contains three fields: the type of the domain, the identifier
of the domain, and an indicator of access privileges. For example, in accessing domain A, a user
would present its corresponding capability. The system would then verify if the domain identifier
on the capability is equal to A, and the privilege specified on the capability allows the requested
operation. Using capabilities, the system can efficiently check user authorization, provided that the
appropriate capability can be extracted from the user account efficiently during each access;
otherwise, the system may need to search through a list of capabilities to find the appropriate
match. In such cases, the performance of this method would not be strictly more efficient than that
of using access control lists. Finally, keeping track or revoking capabilities given out to users is
hard because the system has to search through all user accounts for capabilities which contain the
matching domain identifier.
2.4.3 Hybrid Model
The hybrid model combines access control lists with capabilities. Like access control lists, each
domain in the system would maintain a list which identifies the permissions given to different users
of the system. However, when an authorized user first accesses a domain in a session, the user
would receive a capability which corresponds to his access right. In subsequent access of the
domain in the session, the system could take advantage of the capabilities given out to users rather
than searching through the access control lists. In this way, authorization checking becomes
efficient. Moreover, the access control list attached to each domain allows the system to keep track
of user privileges. As a result, the hybrid mechanism provides both efficiency and accountability.
However, as mentioned in the previous section, the claimed efficiency relies on the assumption that
the appropriate capability can be extracted from the user account efficiently during each access.
In this research, the three mechanisms of access control would be compared by their ability to
fulfill the goals listed in Section 1.2. Which mechanism is most appropriate for the Process
Handbook would then be identified.
2.5 Secure Channels
To achieve confidentiality, integrity, and availability, secure channels have to be established
between clients and servers. This section provides the background on Secure Socket Protocol
(SSL), which aims at providing privacy and authentication between two communicating
applications. [18]
2.5.1 SSL Handshake Protocol
The SSL Handshake Protocol has two major phases. The first phase is used to establish private
communications. The second phase is used for client authentication.
Process Handbook
Client
CLIENT-HELLO = {SSL Version, Cipher Spec, Challenge)
SERVER-HELLO = {Connection ID, Server Certificate, Cipher Spec
CLIENT-MASTER-KEY = {Master Ke' rv er Pubic Key
SERVER-VERIFY = {Challenge Datbifrver Private Key
CLIENT-FINISH = {Connection Im rver Public Key
SERVER-FINISH = {Sessioin 0Id rver Private Key
Figure 2: SSL handshaking for a new session with no client authentication. If a session identifier is
already established, the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message is not sent, and the CLIENT-HELLO
message will include the established session identifier.
2.5.1.1 Phase 1
In Phase 1, the client initiates the protocol by sending the CLIENT-HELLO message3. After
receiving and processing the message, the server responds with the SERVER-HELLO message.
Depending on whether a session identifier has already been established, they would either continue
in Phase 1 to establish the identifier, or enter into Phase 2.
To establish a new session, a new master key is needed. In producing the mater key, the client
retrieves the necessary information from the SERVER-HELLO message4. After generating the
new master key, the client sends a CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message which includes the new
master key encrypted with the server's public key. Finally, the server returns a SERVER-VERIFY
message to authenticate itself, returning the challenge data encrypted with the master key. If the
challenge data is identical to the one in the CLIENT-HELLO message, the client is certain that the
server is authentic, because only the server has the corresponding private key to decrypt the master
key sent in the CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message.
3 The CLIENT-HELLO message includes its SSL version, cipher specification, challenge data, and the
session identifier. While the challenge data is used to authenticate the server, a positive session-identifier
indicates that a session has already been established between client and server.
The SERVER-HELLO message includes connection identifier, server certificate, and cipher
specifications.
~-~----7
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2.5.1.2 Phase 2
In Phase 2, the client is being authenticated. During client authentication, the client would be
requested to produce certain authenticating information, such as a certificate. When authentication
is done, both client and server will send a finish message5, and the application protocol can start to
operate. In all subsequent message exchanges, the application protocol will be operating on top of
the SSL record protocol, which encrypts messages with the ciphers agreed upon during the
handshaking protocol.
2.6 Message Digests
To protect authentication information from being exposed as plain text in the system, passwords
and other related identifying information should be stored in a secure format. Such conversion can
be achieved by the message digest and other hashing algorithms. In this section, the background of
MD5, one of the most popular algorithms used to transform and compress passwords, is presented.
The basic idea of the algorithm as well as the security issues related to MD5 will be discussed.
2.6.1 Description of MD5
The MD5 message digest algorithm takes as input a message of arbitrary length and produces as
output a 128 bit "message digest" of the input [19]. The MD5 algorithm has a few basic steps. In
the first step, the input is being padded so that its length is congruent to 448 mod 512.
Afterwards, the least significant 64 bits of the original input will be appended so that the length of
the resulting message will be exactly a multiple of 512. Then, the message will be transformed into
a 128 bit message digest, making use of certain magic constants as well as specialized
transformation tables.
While the MD5 algorithm is fast on 32-bit machines, it is also conjectured to be computationally
infeasible to break. In other words, a computationally-bounded adversary cannot produce two
different inputs with the same message digest with non-negligible probability. Furthermore, it is
conjectured that the difficulty of coming up with such inputs is on the order of 264 operations.
More remarkably, the difficulty of coming up with a message having a given message digest is on
the order of 2128 operations. Therefore, by creating message digests of the passwords used in the
Process Handbook, the safety of users' authentication information can be greatly enhanced.
5The CLIENT-FINISH message confirms the connection identifier, and the SERVER-FINISH message
confirms the established session identifier.
3.1 Towards a Discretionary Access Control Policy
In the design of the access control policy, one would realize the choice between a mandatory access
control policy and a discretionary access control policy is obvious. Since the Process Handbook is
a distributed system, information retrieved from the Handbook is loaded onto the screens of remote
machines. In a distributed environment, while protecting the sensitivity labels of objects is feasible
through cryptography, there is no way of preventing users from capturing and redistributing
information stored in the objects. For example, the user may capture the content of a screen in a
graphics file, and distribute the file to non-authorized users. In order to prevent this situation, the
operations allowed in user machines must also be restricted. However, even if there are
mechanisms which restrict the operations in the machines, what prevent the users from taking
photographs of the screens? It becomes clear that mandatory policies under a distributed
environment are not practical. Therefore, a discretionary access control policy should be used.
Moreover, the flexibility of discretionary access control policies matches the design goal of the
system. Under a mandatory policy, users are divided into access classes. At a result, while it is
possible to deny the access of an entire access class, this policy may not support the exclusion of
an individual user. In the Process Handbook, it is often desirable to only permit access to the
group of users currently participating in the collaborative design effort. Since the size of the group
varies and the composition of the members changes, the fine-grained control offered by a
discretionary policy is invaluable to the collaborative environment.
3.2 Access Rules for First-class Entities
In the current design, access control is enforced only for first-class entities6 and their access control
objects. While it is possible to regulate the retrieving of other objects 7, controlling the access of
these objects alone is sufficient to protect the information contained in other objects. The reason is
that information stored in other objects is useful only when its context is defined, i.e., when its
associated first-class entity is known. Therefore, by restricting the access of first-class entities, the
access of other objects can be controlled simultaneously . In particular, by following a rule which
6 First-class entities refer to instances of the Entity class, i.e., thing, activity, bundle, port, navigational
node, dependency, resource, and attribute type.
7 Other objects refer to instances of the Relation class and Attribute class. Here, we assume that it is
sufficient for all attributes of an entity to share the same set of access control restrictions.
8 On the other hand, placing access control on non-first-class entities alone do not imply simultaneous
protection for first class entities.
requires the hiding of a relation unless the user has the privilege to access the binding entities, the
system can filter relations which are not relevant or contain sensitive information. Moreover, the
access control restrictions on the first-class entities can determine the restrictions for its associated
attributes, assuming that it is sufficient for all attributes of an entity to share the same set of access
control restrictions. Otherwise, attribute objects with their own access control restrictions would
be desirable. Further discussion can be found in 3.2.1.1.
3.2.1 Classification of Privileges
From the access control perspective, the methods available in the Entity class can be classified into
7 categories: read, create, add relation, remove relation, full edit, move, and delete. Moreover, the
level of authorization implied by the right to perform each of the 7 classified operations is strictly
ordered. In particular, the level of authorization associated with the delete privilege is strictly
higher than the move privilege, which in turn is strictly higher than all edit privileges. (For details,
see Figure 3.)
Figure 3: Authorization Levels of First-class Entities
3.2.1.1 Evolution of the Proposed Classification
The optimal classification of user privileges would provide not only adequate efficiency for the
access checking mechanism, but also flexibility for access control management. In determining a
balance between efficiency and flexibility, our investigation begins with a simple model where there
·
are only two kinds of privileges: read and write. Incrementally, the granularity of the access
control is made finer and finer until any further partitioning of the categories would not be justified.
Looking at the simpler models, one would note that methods of rather different functionality are
being grouped into a single category. For example, if there are only a read privilege and a write
privilege, having the write privilege for an entity would imply at least the right to move as well as
to delete. However, it is obvious that the author of an entity may want to allow some users to be
able to move but not delete the entity. As a result, an increase in the flexibility of these models is
highly desirable.
In the proposed model, each category corresponds to a single abstract operation of the Entity class.
Therefore, in addition to read, edit, and delete, there are the categories of creating specialization
and moving entities across specialization. In particular, creating specialization of an entity is
different from editing the entity because the content of the entity is not altered. Moreover, moving
an entity differs from editing an entity since moving the entity changes its classification in addition
to its content. Finally, editing the content of an entity consists of not only modifying its attributes,
but also adding and removing relations from the entity. Therefore, adding and removing relations
are separated out in the edit operation. Hence, as each category of the proposed model corresponds
to a single abstract operation, methods of different functionality would belong to different
categories. Moreover, because of the similar behavior exhibited by the methods within each
category9 , any further partitioning of the categories would not be justified.
Finally, the defined privileges can be ordered according to the impact of the corresponding
operations on the entity. In particular, the read operation, which has no impact on the entity,
should require the least privilege. Similarly, the create operation, which has no influence on the
content of the entity, should require less privilege than any of the remaining operations. At the
other end, the delete operation, which affects any information contained in the entity, should require
the most privilege. Moreover, since changing the classification of an entity may modify the content
of the entity, the move privilege should be immediately below delete. (For details, see Figure 3) As
an important note, the remove relation category is placed higher than the add relation category. By
making the removal of an existing relation more selective than the addition of a new relation, the
gathering and the discussion of new ideas can be encouraged.
While attributes are not implemented as first-class entities in the current object API design, the
advantage of having access control on attribute objects is foreseeable. By imposing access control
restrictions on attribute objects, one can have different access control restrictions on different
attributes. For example, while only a restricted set of editors can change the "Contact
Information" attribute, almost all editors can change the "Comment" attribute. Following this
design, having the add relation privilege will automatically allow a user to add new attributes to an
9 Here, the assumption that it is sufficient for all attributes of an entity to share the same set of access
control restrictions has been made.
entity. However, to remove an attribute, the user must have the remove relation privilege in the
entity and the delete privilege in the associated attribute object. Finally, as in the current design,
users with full edit privilege would be allowed to modify any attributes lo. This can be
accomplished by automatically granting the delete privilege for the associated attributes to users
with full edit privilege for the entity.
the Specialization Hierarchy.
. The Addition, Modification, and Removal of
he Entity's Attributes.
* The Removal of relations from the entity.
• The Addition of relations from the entity,
e.g. rationale and membership relation.
of the Entity's Specialization.
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Access Control Restrictions.
Figure 4: Summary of Access Privileges and Implications
'o Except "Password" attributes.
3.2.2 Inheritance of Privileges
As discussed in Chapter 2.3.1, the idea of propagating access can be incorporated into our process-
oriented system. However, because of the unique characteristics of the Process Handbook, the
default inheritance rules differ from the ones proposed by Fernandez, Larrondo-Petrie, and Gudes
[11]. In particular, in decomposition, access privileges are not inherited. The reason is that
inheritance of access privileges in decomposition will result in massive generation of new
specialized entities to accommodate changes made to shared entities' access control restrictions.
Moreover, it is sometimes desirable to compose proprietary entities from public ones, or public
entities from proprietary ones. Therefore, for the Process Handbook, access privilege inheritance
in a decomposition hierarchy would not be appropriate. On the other hand, similar to the proposed
model, all access privileges are inherited by default in specialization. However, to allow the
creation of proprietary specialized entities, negative authorizations can be specified to indicate
otherwise. In the following sections, the definitions and implications of the above classified
operations will be discussed; a summary of the access control rules can be found iiFigure 4.
3.2.3 Implication of Privileges
3.2.3.1 Implication of Read Rights
* The right to read a first-class entity implies the right to read its access control restrictions.
* The right to read a first-class entity implies the right to get its attributes.
* The right to get the associated first-class entities, such as those in the specialization, generalization,
decomposition, where-used, or navigational relation, is given if and only if the right to read the
entities is given.
Viewing the content of a first-class entity consists of retrieving not only its attributes, but also its
access control restrictions. The reason is that access control restrictions can be thought of as
attributes of the entities. Moreover, the ability to view the content of entities' access control
restrictions is important to the collaboration environment because it encourages users to
communicate with one another. For example, a user may want to contact and join a particular user
group if he realizes the group has certain permissions on certain entities. Therefore, the ability to
read an entity should imply the ability to view its access control restrictions.
As first-class entities are often closely related to one another, it may be desirable to enforce the
inheritance of access control restrictions across relations. For example, the information stored in
an activity is tied to those stored in its associated ports, sub-activities, dependency, dependency
resource, and dependency managing activity. Therefore, as they complement one another, it may
be convenient to the users if these entities would share the same set of access control restrictions.
However, such rule tremendously decreases the flexibility of the system, as the constraints imposed
would rule out interesting ways where processes can be built. In particular, it may sometimes be
desirable to compose a proprietary activity from public activities. Similarly, it may also be
valuable to build a public activity from proprietary processes. Therefore, to provide a complete
hiding of sensitive information, the link to a sensitive entity should not be disclosed unless the user
has the permission to view the content of the entity. Hence, the ability to view a link should depend
on the ability to read the entities at both ends of the link.
3.2.3.2 Implication of Create Rights
* The right to create for a first-class entity implies the right to create specializations of the entity and to
adopt others' specializations.
* To adopt specializations for a given entity, a user must have the create privilege for the entity, as well
as the move privilege for the entities to be adopted.
* All privileges are inherited by default in creating specializations. If otherwise specified, the access
control restrictions of the specialized entities would be derived from their creators' preferences.
* In creating a new specialization entity, the new entity will first derive the set of users with the
maximum management right from its creator's preference. If no preference is given, the new entity
will derive the set of users with the maximum management right from the profiles of the set of
selected context groups .
Since the level of authorization implied by the ability to create is greater than that implied by the
ability to read, the possession of the create authorization for an entity implies the possession of its
read authorization. In addition, having the create authorization permits the execution of all
operations relevant to adding specialization links. The relevant operations include not only
creating, but also adopting specializations.
In adopting specialization for a given entity, specialization links previously not exist will be
created. Therefore, the create right must be present in order to adopt specializations. Moreover, in
adopting specialization links, the content of the adopted entities as well as the structure of the
specialization hierarchy would be modified. Hence, the user should also have the move privilege
for the entities being adopted.
Furthermore, the more specialized an entity, the more sensitive or proprietary the information it
contains. Therefore, the flexibility of overriding the default access inheritance mechanism is
provided. As a result, while most users can view the content of general processes, the access of
more specialized processes can be denied to the public.
Finally, when a user create a new entity, he can either directly input the set of users with the
maximum management privilege, or select the user groups 12 which represent the context of his
I While there are multiple levels of management privileges, each entity must designate at least one user
to have the highest level of management privilege. Since only users with the maximum management
right are allowed to grant management privileges to other users, a newly created entity must be able to
derive the set of users with such right. Otherwise, the entities could not be properly managed.
12 The set of user groups to be selected must have a parent membership relation with the creator's
authenticated group. Moreover, as the selected groups represent the context where the users perform the
create operation. In the latter case, the system would extract the set of users with the maximum
management privilege from the profiles of the selected user groups. By storing the users with the
maximum management right in the profiles of user groups, one can easily specify the same set of
users with the maximum management privilege for related entities.
3.2.3.3 Implication of Add Relation Rights
* The add relation privilege for an entity implies the right to add relations from the entity.
The add relation privilege for an entity implies the right to read and create for the entity. In
addition, it allows creating new relations from the entity to other entities. Since adding
navigational relations and creating connectors will create new links to other entities, the add
relation privilege should imply the right to add navigational relations as well as to create
connectors.
3.2.3.4 Implication of Remove Relation Rights
* The add relation privilege for an entity implies the right to remove relations from the entity.
The add relation privilege for an entity implies the right to read, create, and add relations for the
entity. In addition, it allows removing existing relations originated from the entity.
3.2.3.5 Implication of Full Edit Rights
* The right to edit a first-class entity implies the right to add, modify, or delete its attributes.
Since the full edit privilege has a higher level of authorization than that of read, create, add
relation, and remove relation, having the full edit privilege implies having all of these privileges. In
addition, having the full edit privilege for a first-class entity allows users to modify its attributes.
3.2.3.6 Implication of Move Rights
* The right to move for a given entity implies the right to make the entity be a specialization of other
entities.
* The right to move can be exercised if and only if the right to move is given in the originating entity of
the move operation and the right to create is given in the destination entity.
Having the move right implies the ability to move an entity across the specialization hierarchy and
to perform any operations on the entity that require the privileges of read, create, and edit.
However, in a move operation, the destination entity must be able to adopt the entities being
moved. Since the ability to adopt is implied by the create privilege, a user should not be able to
move an entity unless he has the create privilege for the destination entity.
create operation, the set of user groups to be selected must be privileged to perform the create operation.
Further explanation of the parent membership relation can be found in Chapter 4.
3.2.3.7 Implication of Delete Rights
* The right to delete an entity implies the right to remove the entity from its specialization hierarchy.
The delete privilege is the highest authorization level for the execution of all normal operations 13
When possessed with the delete privilege for an entity, users can perform any operations on the
entity, except those ones which modify its associated access control restrictions.
In deleting an entity from its specialization hierarchy, a few alternatives exist. The first way is to
delete the entity alone, leaving its immediate children as children of the deleted entities' parents.
Alternatively, one can deny the removal of an entity unless the user has the right to remove the
entity and all of its descendants. However, this method would be too restrictive, as any
specializations of an entity could prevent it from being removed. Finally, another option is that the
removal of an entity will also result in the removal of all its descendant for which the user has the
delete privilege. Using such scheme, subsequent massive cleanup operations may be required, as a
large number of orphans may be created. Hence, the first method appears to provide a good
balance between its alternatives, and is most appropriate for the use of the Process Handbook.
3.3 Access control Management
Managing the access control restrictions of an first-class entity includes the tasks of designating the
restrictions for the entity as well as adding the entity to entity collections 4 . By adding an entity to
an entity collection, the related user groups of the collection will be able to access the entity. As a
result, the ability to add to an entity collection should imply the ability to designate access
permissions to users. Hence, users without the right to grant or revoke access privileges should not
be authorized to perform such operation. In particular, only the users with the maximum
management right should be given the addition power.
To enhance the flexibility for access control management, the right to designate access control
restrictions is further partitioned to support a finer granularity of control. In particular, it consists
of the rights to grant and revoke each individual privilege, i.e., the privilege of read, create, edit'5 ,
move, as well as delete. As shown in Figure 5, the levels of authorization are strictly ordered.
Under this ordering, the possession of a high level management authorization for an entity implies
the possession of all its lower level authorizations. For example, a user who has the grant create
authorization also has the grant read authorization.
13 Normal operations refer to all operations that do not relate to editing the access control restrictions of
the entities.
14 Description of entity collections can be found in Chapter 4.
15 Note that the edit privilege is further partitioned into the full edit privilege, the remove relation
privilege, and the add relation privilege.
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Figure 5: Management Authorization Levels
Using this fine-grained access control policy, a user who has the highest management right can give
up his right, grant as well as revoke other's management rights. In the case where no user groups
have the maximum management privilege for a specific entity, the privilege will be given to the
system manager group16. As mentioned above, only users with the maximum management
privilege should be authorized to add its managing entities to entity collection groups. Since the
domain managers of an entity collection has the power to change its members' access control
restrictions, adding an entity to an entity collection is identical to granting management privileges
to the domain managers. Consequently, the addition power should only be given to users with the
maximum management right.
Compared with other alternative access control management schemes, the chosen scheme offers
both simplicity and flexibility. Alternatively, a scheme which provides a subset of the management
operations offered by the chosen scheme would be simpler. However, in the chosen scheme, since
the levels of authorization associated with the operations remain strictly ordered, little complexity
16 To provide a central administration resource for the first-class entities of the handbook, a user group called
system manager group is always defined in the user group hierarchy. The system manger group would be
responsible for all central administration duties.
is added for the increased flexibility. Furthermore, it is desirable to provide a comprehensive set of
operations in the server objects. While a client can naturally hide operations present in the server
objects from the users, extending the functionality of a server object in a client is inappropriate and
often complex. Finally, when only a limited set of operations is available in the system for access
control management, users who wish to grant management rights to others would easily discover
that he is granting either too much or too little power. As a result of the limited options, users
would be much more reluctant to grant management rights, and hence, collaboration will be
inhibited. Clearly, because of the collaborative nature of the Process Handbook, the chosen
scheme is more desirable.
In addition, a rather different approach can be used. In particular, the management authorizations
and the normal entity access authorizations can be combined to form a single ordered list. As a
result, a very simple and straight-forward mechanism can be used to perform access checking.
However, this scheme is less suitable because different combinations of the two sets of
authorizations may be desired by different users of the system. For example, on one hand, Alice
wants to allow users with read privileges to be able to grant read privileges to others; on the other
hand, Bob may like to allow only users with delete privileges to be able to grant any privileges at
all. Clearly, a more flexible scheme would be desirable to promote different forms and levels of
collaboration. In addition, another advantage of the chosen scheme is that the separation of the
user-vs-entity-management relationship from the user-vs-entity relationship allows a clean
conceptual view of the control model, which is important in the design and maintenance of the
system.
3.3.1 Comparison with Traditional Approaches
The approach proposed for the Process handbook combines the benefits of both traditional self-
control and hierarchical-control approaches. In particular, in creating a new entity in the
handbook, multiple user groups can be specified as having management privileges. When a single
user group is designated as having the management privilege, management closely resembles a self-
control approach. On the other hand, when multiple groups are designated, the chosen
management scheme looks like that of the hierarchical-control approach, in which the benefit of
having backup managers can be achieved. However, different from the hierarchical-control
approach, the proposed method does not necessarily lead to concentration of power in a few user
groups. The reason is that by allowing the presence of self-control entities, power can be
distributed more evenly among users. As a result, the proposed approach is chosen over each of
the traditional approaches.
This chapter proposes the appropriate extension to the server API to complement the access control
policy discussed earlier. In particular, two new types of first-class entities, i.e., user groups and
entity collections, will be introduced in the system. Any changes implied by the addition of these
new entities will also be discussed in this chapter.
4.1 User Groups and Entity Collections
4.1.1 First-class Entities
To efficiently manage the access control relationship among entities and users, users are
represented by user groups, and entities are organized into entity collections. User groups and
entity collections are justified to be first-class entities because creating specializations and
decomposition of these entities are useful. In particular, it is useful to create specialization of a
user group where the specialized group will inherit the privileges granted to its parent, but that the
restrictions imposed on accessing the methods of the specialized group differ from that of its
parent. Similarly. It may also be desirable to create specialized entity collections where the access
restrictions for the members of the specialized collections will be inherited from their parents.
Moreover, the decomposition as well as the membership relations are applicable to user groups and
entity collections1 . In particular, membership relations among user groups allow a user group to
share the privileges given to its parents. Similarly, membership relations among entity collections
allow the access control restrictions of an entity to be specified in its parents. Furthermore, as in
all first-class entities, the decomposition relation provides information about how these entities are
composed.
In Figure 6, sample membership hierarchies of user groups as well as entity collections are
presented. Though the hierarchies do not need to be arranged as presented in the figure, the system
manager group must be present in the user group hierarchy to act as the central administrator of
the handbook. Moreover, the "User Universe" group and the "Entity Universe" collection will
always be the roots of the two hierarchies. Any groups or collections created will automatically
17 While the membership relation closely resembles the decomposition relation, they have slightly
different interpretations. In particular, the membership relation is a more specific from of decomposition.
To make the point clear, consider the membership and decomposition relation of organizations. It is
apparent that the aggregation of all the members of an organization would not adequately represent the
organization itself. Specifically, the organization would contain additional dimensions such as goals,
rules, offices, etc.
ecome the members of the two roots respectively. Finally, since all user groups are entities, all
ser groups are also members of "Entity Universe."
Figure 6: Membership Hierarchy of Entity Collections and User Groups. Non-shaded objects
represent entity collections; shaded objects represent user groups.
Vith the entity collection and user group abstractions, membership relation among entities can be
laintained. Moreover, an individual user group can be represented by a group without any
iembers. In all groups and collections, their profiles s , which provide useful information about
leir characteristics and status, will be maintained. Those information would be stored as
ttributes associated with the entities. Furthermore, passwords will be stored in user groups for
uthentication purpose. The passwords will be stored as an attribute and in a secure format' 9 . For
assword attributes, their retrieval will be handled as an exception in which only users with the
iaximum management right are authorized to access.
A profile for an entity collection includes its name, contact information and description. A profile for a user
roup includes its name, contact information and description, and session viewing preference.
Since passwords are sensitive information, all passwords are compressed and transformed using a
lessage digest algorithm, MD5. As discussed in Section 2.6, MD5 is conjectured to be computationally
feasible to break.
Finally, to avoid the situation where there exists an entity in the system where no users or groups
have maximum management rights, special treatment is necessary. One possible solution is to
prevent the above situation from occurring. Alternatively, one can resolve any inconsistencies that
arise by making the system manager group assume the right to manage all entities which do not
designate any groups to have the maximum management privileges. Comparing the two solutions,
the latter is more flexible, since putting too many constraints in the server would leave few rooms
for manipulation in the clients. In addition, since the complexity required to resolve inconsistencies
after removing an user group is small, the second solution seems even more suitable.
Figure 7: Access Control Restrictions for Entity Collections and other First-class Entities.
4.1.2 Enhancing Efficiency
By extending the server API with user groups and entity collections, access control restrictions can
be maintained more conveniently and efficiently. This increase in maintainability is due to two
reasons. The first reason is that an entity collection can specify the access control restrictions for
its member entities. Different from other first-class entities, entity collections have two additional
sets of access control restrictions, i.e., the set of domain access control restrictions and the set of
domain management access control restrictions 2 . While the set of domain access control
restrictions regulates the execution of its member entities' operations, the set of domain
management access control restrictions specifies the users allowed to add and remove domain
20 All first-class entities, except entity collection, have two sets of access control restrictions, i.e., the set of
entity access control restrictions and the set of entity management access control restrictions. While the
set of entity access control restrictions regulates the execution of the methods in the Entity class, the set of
entity management access control restrictions specifies the users allowed to add and remove entity access
control restrictions.
access control restrictions. Using domain access control restrictions, the access of a large group of
entities can be controlled in a single location, and the need to update each entity individually is
reduced. In Figure 7, the contrast between an entity collection and other first-class entities is
presented.
Another reason for the increased maintainability is that access control privileges given to a user
group applies to all its members. As a result, by giving the read privilege to "User Universe" to
access the entity "Make Coffee,", all users in the Handbook will be authorized to read the content
of "Make Coffee." In an alternative system where users are not related to one another, giving
privileges to all users would require the system to give the privilege to each user individually.
Moreover, when revoking privileges, one has to select each individual user to be removed, rather
than selecting a group of users at a time. Clearly, membership relation among user groups provide
great convenience for managing access control restrictions.
Figure 8: An Example of Using Entity Collections and User Groups. Non-shaded Objects represent
entity collections; shaded objects represent user groups.
To provide a concrete understanding of the benefits provided by user groups and entity collections,
an example is provided here. Consider that Company A is a consulting company which is
currently undertaking two particular projects, alpha and beta. To efficiently maintain the access
control restrictions for each of its projects, one possible way is that a new user group and entity
collection is created for each of its projects, with all relevant entities added to the appropriate
project entity collections. (See Figure 8.) Moreover, all project user groups are added to the
company user group, and all project entity collections are added to the company entity collection.
Finally, each project entity collection would designate its corresponding user group as the only
group privileged to have full access of its members. Meanwhile, domain access privileges would
be specified in the company entity collection. For example, all members of the company user
group will have create privileges, and all members of "User Universe" will be granted read
privileges in the company domain. As a result, changing the set of users with full access to the
projects only requires changing the members of the corresponding user groups. Moreover, when
additional projects are undertaken, new user groups and entity collections can be created while the
access control restrictions for each project can be maintained in isolation.
Clearly, the membership relation among user groups and entity collections can be carefully
designed to satisfy different needs. The above example only presents a particular way where one
could systematically manage the access control restrictions for a given set of entities.
4.1.3 Membership Relation
To add an entity to an entity collection, the user should have two specific privileges. In particular,
the subscriber must have the add relation privilege for the desired entity collection, and the
maximum management right for the entity to be added. Similarly, to remove a membership
relation, the user must have the remove relation privilege for the desired entity collection, and the
maximum management right for the entity to be removed.
As an important note, membership relation is transitive in nature. In other words, for user groups,
if "Project Alpha" is a member of "Company A," and "Company A" is a member of "Enterprise
B," "Project Alpha" will entitle to the union of privileges given to "Company A" as well as
"Enterprise B." Similarly, for entity collections, the domain access restriction for a given entity
collection applies to all direct or indirect members of the collection.
Finally, membership relation can be two-way. For example, "Group X" can be made a member of
"Group Y" while "Group Y" is currently a member of "Group X." Such property does not conflict
with the proposed access control model. Specifically, for user groups, if "Group X" and "Group
Y" are mutual members, privileges given to one group will be given to the other group. For entity
collections, a mutual member relationship implies that the domain access restriction defined in a
collection is applicable to the collection where the restrictions are defined.
4.1.4 User and Entity Universe
The "User Universe" group, and the "Entity Universe" collection are organized to provide single
roots of navigation for both user groups and entity collections. Under this model, all entities will
be members of "Entity Universe" while entities representing user groups will also be members of
"User Universe." To maintain such relationship, all entities must be directly or indirectly related to
"Entity Universe." Meanwhile, all entities representing user groups must also have a direct or
indirect membership relation with "User Universe." A direct relation is one where an entity is
explicitly specified as a member of a group or collection, while an indirect relation is one where the
membership relation is realized through the transitivity property. However, if entities are allowed
to relate to "Entity Universe" indirectly, the system must constantly monitor the membership
relations among entities so that each entity is a member of at least one group. As a result,
tremendous burden is placed on the system to maintain the membership relation. Even if back
21 Definitions for direct and indirect members can be found in Section 4.1.4.
pointers are used, given the current database schema, repairing a corrupted database is complex 22.
On the other hand, if all entities are required to relate directly to "Entity Universe," accountability
can be achieved without much work, and database repairing can be done with a single query.
Therefore, in the proposed model, all entities are required to be a direct member of "Entity
Universe." In addition, all entities representing user groups are required to be a direct member of
"User Universe."
As a result of the above requirements, removing an entity from "Entity Universe" must correspond
to the removal of the entity in the system. Similarly, removing a user group from "User Universe"
must correspond to the removal of the user group. Hence, removing membership relations in
"Entity Universe" and "User Universe" bear special consequences, and the privileges for
performing such operation should be limited to the system manager group alone.
4.2 Addition and Removal of First-class Entities
With the addition of entity collections, the creation and removal of all first-class entities would
require slight changes. In particular, when a first-class entity is created, it would become a
member of "Entity Universe". Moreover, for entities representing user groups, they would become
members of "User Universe." Using this procedure, the membership hierarchy of both entity
collections and user groups will have a single root of navigation. Hence, a user can easily make
certain entities world-readable by giving the "User Universe" group read privileges, or make all
entities readable by certain user groups by granting the groups read privileges for the "Entity
Universe" domain.
Similar to the procedure discussed above, the removal of first-class entities now require additional
cleanup procedures. Specifically, when a first-class entity is removed, all membership relation
which refers to the removed entity will be destroyed. Moreover, all access control restrictions
pertaining to the entity being removed will be deleted as well. If the removed entity is a user group,
the system manager group will assume the right to manage all entities which do not designate any
user groups to have the maximum management privilege after the removal.
Finally, because of the presence of membership relations among entity collections and user groups,
the access control inheritance mechanism has to be updated. In particular, when inheriting access
control relations in creating specialization, the new specialized entity will be granted the same set
of membership relations as its parent . In this way, the new entity will share not only the same set
22 If back pointers are used, database repairing requires multiple queries to be executed. On the other
hand, if all entities are required to relate directly to "Entity Universe," database repairing can be done
efficiently using a single query.
23 As an important note, membership relations are granted, not inherited, to the specialized entity. As
shown in the scenario presented in Appendix D, while an entity has changed from one review status
collection to another, its children should not be affected at all.
of entity access control relations with its parent, but also the same set of access control relations
implied by the membership relations.
4.3 Authentication to the Process Handbook
The discussion so far has only touched on the low-level structure for storing authentication
information, i.e., passwords stored as attributes in user groups. To make the low-level procedures
useful to the handbook, a high-level authentication protocol must be present to deal with the
interactions among clients and servers. In this section, a brief description of the user authentication
model is presented.
In the core of the authentication model, the SSL (Secure Socket Layer) protocol, discussed in
Section 2.5, is used. Since SSL is one of the standard protocols used for establishing secure
channels in the Internet, many existing free and commercial software are layered on top of this
protocol. For example, most web clients and servers support communication using SSL. Hence,
the Process Handbook Server can directly employ such tools, without the need to implement its
own set of routines for establishing private channels. Through the SSL protocol, three basic
properties of a secured channel are achieved:
* The channel is private. Encryption is used for all messages after a simple handshake is used to
define a secret key.
* The channel is authenticated. The server endpoint of the conversation is always authenticated.
* The channel is reliable. The message transport includes a message integrity check (using a
MAC).
In the Process Handbook authentication model, user group authentication will be done through
matching the message digest24 of the user group password with that set in its profile. Since the
communication channel is private, assuming that the adversary is computationally-bounded, a valid
name and password pair can only be supplied by the actual users. Moreover, the reliability and
privacy of the channel protects subsequent exchange of messages from being manipulated.
Session Object
Session Identifier
Date/Time of Creation
Figure 9: A Session Object
24 The passwords are compressed and transformed to form message digests using the MD5 algorithm.
ithenticated to a user group, the server would keep track of the state of the
.nnel by generating and exporting a session object. The session object will bind
nber with a time stamp to form a session identifier. (See Figure 9.) By binding
with a time stamp, the search space required to guess a valid session identifier
e as more and more new session objects are created. Assuming the system
Itiple create-session requests simultaneously, each session object would contain
mp. Hence, in any circumstances, given a valid time stamp, the search space of
itifier is always identical to the size of the random number generated.
d server environment, the web server can extract the session identifier of the
export a cookie similar to the one shown in Figure 10. During subsequent
laving to check user passwords again for authentication, the server would verify
cookie. After each session, the cookie will be automatically removed from
Authentication Info = <User Group Name, User Group Password>
Cookie = <Session ID>
Cookie Retrieved During Subsequent Authenticaiton Checking
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ge of messages, all information will be private to the client and server because of
ired channel by SSL. When authenticated, a user would become empowered to
granted to his authenticated user group, as well as other groups which have a
relation with the authenticated group.
nembership relation with B, B is a member of A.
In the Process Handbook, since the information for user accounts and other entities are stored in a
relational database, queries have to be executed in checking access authorization. From the high
level perspective, access control lists and capabilities provide different virtual views of the access
control relations. While access control lists provide the view from an entity's point of view,
capabilities provide the view from a user's perspective. However, in the implementation level, the
abstract view is flattened. Specifically, both views will be extracted from a single table storing the
access control relations among user groups and entities.
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Figure 11: Process Handbook Access Control Objects
To make use of the access control list or capability models, caching will be necessary for fast
retrieval. During subsequent access checking, the system would first retrieve the relevant access
control or capability list from the cache, and then process the list to extract the result. Comparing
a mechanism which uses the access control list model to one which uses the capability model, they
have comparable performance. In particular, depending on the specific situations and
implementations, each mechanism may be preferable to the other. For example, assume that both
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access control and capability lists are implemented as linked lists. Given these specific
implementations, if the access control list of the requested entity is short, access checking using the
access-control-list view would be efficient. On the other hand, if the capability list of the requested
user group is short, access checking using the capability-list view would be preferable. However, a
major drawback of both mechanisms is that since the lists are often fairly long, the cost of
maintaining the cache is extremely expensive. Yet, if caching is not employed, the appropriate lists
have to be extracted form the database during each access checking, and the efficiency of the
system would be seriously affected.
Alternatively, a SQL query can be used to extract the correct user group access privilege directly
from the database. Using this method, the access control list and capability list abstraction would
be used solely as virtual views of the access control relations in the system, and for their
maintenance. Since all computations are done in a single query, redundant operations can be
reduced; hence, the performance of this mechanism is faster than that of extracting and then
processing an access control or capability list from the database. Moreover, it can be further
optimized by caching the membership relation among user groups and entity collections. Since
modifications of the access control lists are infrequent comparing to normal access, the cost of
cache misses would be small. In addition, the cost of maintaining the cache is much smaller than
the above scenario because the amount of space needed to store the membership relations is much
smaller. In the Process Handbook access control mechanism, the access control manager
(ACMgr) class is implemented to by-pass the access control list and capability abstraction. As
shown in Figure 12, it serves as an abstraction for efficient access checking, as well as for
initializing and cleaning up of access control relations.
GetUserPrivilege(EntitylD, UserGrouplD, ACLType, Status)
GetPrivilegedGroups(EntitylD, UserGrouplD, Prvilege, Status)
InitNotify(EntitylD, UserGrouplD, Status)
RemoveNotify(EntitylD, EntityType, Status)
ChangeMemberNotify(EntitylD, EntityType, Status)
...Figure 12: Access Control Manager Class
Figure 12: Access Control Manager Class
5.1 Access Control Manager
The access control manager class provides an abstraction for retrieving access privilege as well as
for initializing and cleaning up of access control relations. Using the manager class abstraction,
multiple checking or updating can be done using the same object. As a result, optimization can be
performed to improve efficiency. In particular, caching can be done within a manager object. By
maintaining a cache to store the membership relations, the system can reduce the search space
needed in checking authorization. Moreover, since modifications of the membership relations are
infrequent comparing to normal access, the cost of cache misses would be negligible. Therefore,
the access control manager class, shown in Figure 12, provide enhanced efficiency over a more
decentralized design. (For the specifications of the access control manager class, see Appendix A.)
5.1.1 Using the Access Control Manager
To demonstrate the usage of the access control manager, consider the scenario where Bob wants to
read the attributes of the process "Make Coffee." (See Figure 13.) As the first step, Bob
authenticates to his individual user group, "Bob", by providing the authentication information
stored in his profile. After successful matching of identification using an authentication manager
object26, Bob will be given a session object and authenticated to use the privileges given to "Bob,"
as well as all other groups which have a parent membership relation with his group. These
relevant groups will be cached in an access control manager object during the first time when the
membership relations are retrieved. To get the content of "Make Coffee," the client sends a
message to the GetAttributes method of the "Make Coffee" object. For the purpose of access
control, it also passes the session identifier in the session object to the server, which would then
send a message to the Authenticate method of the authentication manager object. If authentication
is successful, Bob's user group identifier will be returned to the server. Afterwards, the server
would pass the returned user group identifier, the type identifier for the access control relation27, as
well as the entity identifier of "Make Coffee" to the GetUserPrivilege method of the access control
manager object to get Bob's actual privilege. As the last step, the server compares the returned
privilege with that required by the read operation, and decides whether to return the requested
information or not.
In addition, when creating specializations, it may be desirable for a user to select the context where
he performs the create operation. The set of all possible contexts is represented by the set of all
user groups in the Process Handbook which have the create privilege for the entity and the parent
membership relation with the user. To determine this set of all possible contexts, the server can
26 The specification of the authentication manager (AuthMgr) class can be found in Appendix A.
27 The type identifier for the access control relation (ACLType) specifies whether access control relation
represents entity access control restrictions (PH_ACENTITY), entity management access control
restrictions (PH_AC_ENTITY_MANAGEMENT), domain restrictions (PH_AC_DOMAIN), or domain
management restrictions (PH_AC_DOMAIN_MANAGEMENT).
send a GetPrivilegedGroup message to an access control manager object. In return, the manager
object will then return an array of identifiers which correspond to the identifiers of the context
groups. Meanwhile, designation of the user groups which have the maximum management right
for a newly created entity can be done by sending a InitNotify message to a manager object. As a
result, the groups specified will be given the revoke delete privilege in the entity management
access control list, and the delete privilege in the entity access control list. If the entity is an entity
collection, the groups will also be given the revoke delete privilege in the domain management
access control list, and the delete privilege in the domain access control list. Finally, when an
entity is removed, calling the RemoveNotify method of the access control manager class will
remove all access control restrictions that relate to the entity, avoiding useless information from
being accumulated in the database.
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Figure 13: Example of Using the ACMgr Class.
5.1.2 Evaluating Access to Entities and Entity Collections
While each entity can be in multiple entity collections, each entity collection may be associated
with multiple user groups. As a user can be members of multiple user groups, there may exist a
situation where a user has conflicting access rights in performing an operation. Hence, one has to
pay special attention in resolving access permission conflicts.
To resolve the issue of permission conflicts, the following solutions have been considered:
* Assume minimum privilege from the set of conflicting privileges
I I I
* Assume maximum privilege from the set of conflicting privileges
* Assume the privilege designated in the most specialized access control relation among the
relevant entities and their related user groups.
In evaluating the alternative solutions, one would realize that the first solution could be easily
rejected. While increasingly restrictive user groups should have increasingly privileged
permissions, the minimum privilege rule could not take advantage of such property. To
demonstrate the point, consider an example where the manager of a process wants to have two
general groups of users. While the first group contains all users of the handbook, the second group
is restricted to CCS members. Moreover, only the second group has the privilege of editing the
content of the process. However, such setting cannot be accomplished since all CCS members are
users of the handbook, and by the minimum privilege rule, the second group is only given the read
privilege. Clearly, this example shows the limitation of the first solution.
Contrasted to the first solution, the second solution can accomplish the setting desired in the above
example. Using the maximum privilege rule, a group and its members can relate to an entity
simultaneously without destroying the more privileged permissions given to the members. As
member groups are entitled to the privileges given to their parents, the problem of setting up a less
privileged member group is not relevant in the defined access control model, and can be ignored.
Using the third solution, privileges will be partially determined by the positions of the relevant
entities and user groups in the specialization hierarchy. Under this scheme, promotion and denial
of privileges can be flexibly accomplished by propagating and overriding access privileges through
specialization. However, such flexibility comes at a cost. The reason is that a unique ordering of
the access control relations in the specialization hierarchy does not exist. To resolve ambiguities of
ordering, rules such as the maximum and minimum privilege rules have to be used. Despite the
flexibility provided, the complexity of this solution makes it less desirable to the Process
Handbook. Hence, the good balance of flexibility and efficiency makes the maximum privilege
rule the optimal solution to be used.
5.2 Access Control List and Capability List
The maintenance and accounting of the access control relations is provided by ACL (access control
list) objects and CapL (capability list) objects. Using the ACL objects, a first-class entity can
obtain the list of user groups privileged to access its content. Moreover, the managers of an entity
can add and remove access control entries for its associated ACL object. On the other hand, CapL
objects allow a user group to review its access control relation with other entities in the system.
However, except for inheriting privileges in specialization, the content of a CapL object cannot be
changed because granting and revoking privileges for an entity should not be done from the user
group perspective. Both ACL and CapL classes are shown inFigure 14.
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Figure 14: Access Control List and Capability Classes
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Figure 15: ACLEntry and CapLEntry Classes
Since both ACL and CapL objects provide virtual views of the database content, consistency issues
arise. In particular, the views provided by the objects may become inconsistent with the data in the
database immediately after the objects have been retrieved. However, inconsistency would not
affect the maintenance of ACL objects. The reason is that removing access control relations that
have already been removed somewhere else does not have any undesirable consequences.
Similarly, while different privileges could be granted to the same user group within a close interval,
the maximum privilege rule is there to resolve any conflicts.
To allow users to traverse the content of ACL and CapL objects, ACLEntry and CapLEntry
objects are used. Each ACL object produces a set of ACLEntry objects that correspond to the
privileges given to the users. Similarly, each CapL object produces a set of CapLEntry objects
that correspond to the privileges possessed by its associated user group. While an ACLEntry
object specifies a privilege for a given user group, a CapLEntry object specifies a privilege for a
given entity. Figure 15 shows the ACLEntry and CaplEntry classes.
5.2.1 Using ACL and CapL
To demonstrate the usage of ACL, consider the scenario of Bob granting Alice the create privilege
for the activity "Make Coffee," and assume that Bob has already retrieved its ACL object. To
grant the read privilege to Alice, Bob will construct a new ACL entry object which stores Alice's
user group identifier, the type identifier 2 8 for the access control relation, as well as the permission
level which corresponds to the create privilege. Using the AddEntry method, the specified access
control relation between "Alice" and "Make Coffee" will be added to the database. Inside the
method, access checking described in Section 5.1.1 will be executed to determine whether Bob has
the grant create privilege for the entity "Make Coffee."
In another situation, Bob, authenticated to the user group "Bob", wants to look at what privileges
are given to his user group. As a result, Bob requests his user group object to return its capability
list. After the regular access control checking using an access control manager object, the system
could determine whether Bob has adequate privilege to read the entity. Assuming Bob has
sufficient authorization, his request will be granted, and a CapL object of Bob's group will be
returned. Afterwards, Bob can examine each entry of the list by using the GetFirstEntry and
GetNextEntry methods of the CapL class. Traversing an ACL object is identical to that of CapL;
using the GetFirstEntry and GetNextEntry of ACL, the ACL object would return an ACLEntry
object for every access restriction it contains, and users can then inspect the properties of each of
its returned objects.
Finally, as a convenient way for combining ACL objects, the append method in the ACL class
allows copying the access control restrictions contained in an ACL object to another ACL object.
This method is particular useful in certain specific situations. For example, if a user wants entity
"A" to use the same access control restrictions as entity "B", and that changes made to the access
control list of entity "B" should not affect that of entity "A," the append method of the ACL class
would perfectly satisfy his goal. On the other hand, if a user prefers to have a group of entities
share the same set of access control restrictions, the group of entities can be placed under a single
28 In this case, the type identifier for the access control relation is PH_AC_ENTITY.
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6.1 Summary of API Changes
To integrate the proposed access control policy to the API objects, the first-class entities must be
extended to execute access checking before performing every requested action. Moreover, since
each operation may require a different level of privilege, the appropriate privilege requirement
should be identified using the rules proposed in Section 3.2 as the basis. Meanwhile, to link
entities to their corresponding access control relations in the database, ACL objects are maintained
as entity attributes. When the entity represents a user group, an additional attribute storing its
associated CapL object is also maintained. Finally, as discussed in Chapter 4, two new first-class
entities are added, namely, user groups and entity collections.
As user groups and entity collections are discussed in depth in Chapter 4, and that storing ACL
and CapL objects as entity attributes is self-explanatory, this section focuses on the low-level
details of access checking. In particular, the discussion will be divided into 3 parts. While the first
part investigates what changes are needed in the parameters of first-class entities' methods, the
second part summarizes how to make use of the parameters and the access control manager class
to execute access checking. Finally, based on the rules proposed in Section 3.2, the minimal
privilege required for each method of the Entity class will be identified.
6.1.1 Additional Parameters for First-class Entity's Methods
For every method implemented in the Entity class, additional parameters are needed to identify the
user which sends the message to the entity. While it appears that a user group identifier will be
sufficient for identification purpose, it turns out that additional security checking should be placed
for authentication purpose. As malicious users can easily come up with valid user group
identifiers, authentication based on user group identifiers would not be adequate. As discussed in
Section 4.3.3, a possible solution is the use of session objects. Since the session objects binds a
large random number with a time stamp, it would be extremely difficult for any computationally-
bounded adversary to produce the content of any valid session identifiers. Therefore, the session
identifier contained in a session object should be passed to the server during the execution of each
method of the Entity class. If the parameters are consistent with the set of records stored in the
server, the server could trust that the user identifier specified indeed corresponds to the actual user.
Thus, for every method implemented in the Entity class, the content of the session object must be
passed.
6.1.2 Access Checking Using an Access Control Manager Object
Once the server has confirmed the validity of a session object, it can then pass the corresponding
user group identifier together with an entity identifier to the GetUserPrivilege method of an ACMgr
object. Furthermore, during the call to GetUserPrivilege, the entity should specify the relevant type
of access control relation. In particular, when the user is executing the methods of an entity, the
relevant type is PH_AC_ENTITY. On the other hand, when the user is modifying an entity's ACL
object, the relevant type should be PH_AC_ENTITY_MANAGEMENT. Finally, the types
PH_AC_DOMAIN and PH_AC_DOMAIN_MANAGEMENT, which refer to domain-related
access control relations, are also available.
6.1.3 Identifying Minimal Privilege Requirement
Based on the rules proposed in Section 3.2, the minimal privilege requirements for the methods
available in the Entity class are shown below:
Minimal Privilege Requirement Methods
PHAC_READ_PRIVILEGE GetAttribute
GetAttributes
GetAttributeValue
GetAttributeObject*
GetNavRelations*
GetSpecializations*
GetGeneralizations*
GetDecomposition*
GetWhereUsed*
GetEndPorts*
GetConnectors*
PH_AC_CREATE_PRIVILEGE AddNewSpecialization
AdoptSpecialization
PH_AC_ADDRELATION_PRIVILEGE AddNewNavRelation
CreateConnector
PH_AC REMOVERELATIONPRIVILEGE DeleteNavRelation
PHAC_EDIT_PRIVILEGE AddNewAttribute
AddItemtoAttrCol
RemoveltemfromAttrCol
SetAttributeValue
SetAttributeObject
DeleteAttribute
AddDecomp
RemoveFromDecomp
ReplacelnDecomp
PH_ACMOVEPRIVILEGE MoveToParent
AdoptSpecialization 29
PH_ACDELETE_PRIVILEGE RemoveFromParent
29 The move privilege must be present for the entity to be adopted.
For all methods marked with an asterisk, the minimal privilege required depends on the entities at
both ends of the link. Therefore, for these methods, the system should check the user privileges at
both end of the relation. Finally, to obtain the corresponding authorization level for granting and
revoking management privileges, one can subtract a management offset,
PH_AC_MANAGEMENT_PRIVILEGEOFFSET, from the normal privilege level. For example, the
authorization which corresponds to granting read privilege is PH_AC_READ_PRIVILEGE -
PH_AC_MANAGEMENT_PRIVILEGE_OFFSET; and that corresponds to revoking read privilege is
PH_AC_READPRVILEGE + PH_AC_MANAGEMENT_PRIVILEG_OFFSET. A summary of these
constants can be found in Appendix B. Using this construct, the number of constants required
would be tremendously reduced. As a result, one could avoid the need of huge case statements in
the body of the access control code, and consequently, improve the maintainability of the system.
6.2 Evaluation
The objective of this section is to evaluate how the access control policy fulfills the goals identified
in Section 1.2. In particular, we would like to answer the following questions: Is the system
flexible enough? Does it offer adequate protection of the information stored? Is it efficient and
scalable?
6.2.1 Flexibility
The ability to manipulate the membership relation among user groups and entity collections
provide tremendous flexibility to the users, as they can decide how the access control restrictions
for their entities are to be maintained. Moreover, the proposed system can easily hide information
under development by adding entities under construction to a "Scratch Area" collection, and giving
its domain privilege only to the relevant developers. Moreover, this design can support incremental
disclosure of changes made to the Handbook by transferring entities between collections, e.g.,
between a "Scratch Area" collection and a "Product Release" collection.
In addition, many new forms of collaboration can be achieved. For example, users can now
compose public entities using private ones, or private entities using public ones. Since the model
does not impose any additional access constraints on related entities, the access control of
proprietary entities would not be affected even when linked to public entities. In addition to the
fine granularity of control offered by the model, entity access restrictions are separated from its
management restriction. Consequently, in one entity, managers who can grant read privileges may
only have read privileges for the entity; in another entity, all managers may have at least the edit
privilege.
As an interesting application, the proposed access control model can support switching between
different views of the Process Handbook. For demonstration purpose, consider that there are two
user groups called "Expert Users" and "Novice Users". While "Expert Users" can view anything
in the system, "Novice Users" can only view a restrictive set of entities. Moreover, assume that all
users are allowed to add and remove members of both "Expert Users" and "Novice Users". With
these arrangements, a user authenticated to his own user group can dynamically add and remove
himself as a member of "Expert Users" or "Novice Users"3o. By changing the membership
relations, the access control mechanism would automatically regenerate the set of privileges
entitled to the authenticated group, and consequently switch the user view of the Process
Handbook. For example, by removing the authenticated group as the member of "Expert Users"
and adding it as the member of "Novice Users", the system would have switched from the "Expert
Users" view to the "Novice Users" view.
Finally, since an entity can have more than one user group with the maximum management right,
the management scheme resembles both self-control and hierarchical-control approaches.
Therefore, the creator of an entity can choose to manage the entity by himself, if he fears that too
much power is being concentrated in a few user groups, or to designate backup managers to share
the management responsibility.
6.2.2 Protection
By granting access to the desired user groups alone, the proposed access control mechanism
prevents irrelevant user groups from executing protected methods of the Entity class. Moreover,
with the authentication protocol discussed in Section 4.3.3, faking the identity of another user
group will be computationally infeasible. As communication among clients and servers is
protected by SSL, eavesdropper could not gain information regarding user group passwords as
well as contents of any entities in the system. Even if a user has read access to the database, the
passwords of the user groups are converted to message digests using the MD5 algorithm. Again,
predicting the password that correspond to a particular message digest is not feasible within a
computationally-bounded environment. Therefore, the system can be safeguarded from attacks by
any computationally-bounded adversary.
6.2.3 Efficiency and Scalability
The system is both efficient and scalable. As discussed in Chapter 5, because of efficiency
reasons, a few alternative solutions have been rejected during the design of the access control
mechanism. In particular, using the access control list or capability list metaphor for access
checking is undesirable because the number of entities associated with a user or the number of
users associated with an entity grows much faster than the membership relation among users
groups and entity collections. Therefore, caching all access control relations would not be a
scalable choice compared to that of caching only membership relations. Moreover, since finding
the membership relations represents the bottleneck operation in access checking, caching the
membership relations allows the efficiency of the access checking mechanism to be higher than that
of other alternatives.
30 The user should also have the maximum management right for his authenticated group in order to add
and remove membership relation to his authenticated group.
Moreover, the proposed mechanism for initializing and cleaning up access control relations avoids
the need of constantly monitoring and enforcing certain relationship among entities. Since each
entity in the system is a member of "Entity Universe," database repairing can be done efficiently.
Moreover, the system does not have to make sure that an entity is still a member of some other
entities when a membership relation has been removed. Rather, the system has to pay attention
only when a membership relation is being removed from "Entity Universe."31. Similarly, instead of
checking whether an entity has designated at least one user group to have the maximum user
privilege whenever a user group is being removed, the system delays the checking until an ACL
object associated with the entity is requested. In this way, the checking can be done with much less
work, as most of the work required has to be done anyway in retrieving an ACL object. Finally,
the lag time is tolerable because the system manager group will be given the maximum
management privilege before any users attempt to check or modify the ACL objects associated
with the entity. Hence, they will know whom to contact in any circumstances.
31 For user groups, when the membership relationship is removed either from "Entity Universe" or "User
Universe," the user group should be removed from the system.
Currently, the access control model has been built in a simple environment aimed at demonstrating
the functionality and behavior of the model. In this environment, each first-class entity is
simplified to contain only a name and identifier pair, and that the only relation implemented is the
membership relation. A sample screen of the user interface is shown iWFigure 17.
Figure 17: Demonstration Screen
When the extension proposed in Section 6.1 has been made to the Process Handbook object API,
the access control module can be migrated to a client and server environment. As a result, multiple
user sessions can be supported. Moreover, users can extract a much richer set of characteristics
from user groups and entity collections in the actual environment. In particular, one could
experiment with employing both specialization and the membership relation to satisfy specific
access control requirements. In addition, as discussed in Section 3.2.1.1, extensions can be made
by imposing access control restrictions on attribute objects. Consequently, one can have different
access control restrictions on different attributes, achieving a even more flexible access control
model.
Furthermore, when the access of entities is regulated, specializations may not be visible to all
users. Consequently, modifying the content of an entity may lead to changes hidden to the users,
i.e., changes that have been made to the hidden specialized entities. Therefore, the issue of version
control arises. In particular, since modifications of an entity affect its specializations, what
mechanisms should be present to maintain such propagation of changes? A possible solution is
that users of the specialized entities will be notified when an entity higher up in the specialization
hierarchy has been modified. Afterwards, changes will be propagated, overwriting the original
content of the affected entities. Yet, a better solution may be that the content of each affected
entities will be copied to a new entity which will then be added as the child of a version control
repository collection for the specific entity. Consequently, users can analyze the differences among
various versions, and draw valuable observation. As the idea of version control fits nicely with
that of incremental disclosure of changes, the idea of having a basic workspace for each entity in
the Handbook can be introduced. In one part of the workspace, say the scratch area, the developer
of the entity can conduct development process, and in another part of the workspace, say the
product release area, new versions of an entity are released. The introduction of such workspace
will be a vital step to reduce unexpected side-effects in the system and to improve the ease of
collaboration among Process Handbook users.
Finally, the issue of how access control relations are to be displayed at the front end would require
attention. For example, should ACL objects be displayed as navigational nodes? Under this
model, all access control information can be found under a single navigational root for access
control information. However, how should the navigational hierarchy for access control
information be organized? Clearly, these questions have to be resolved to determine the optimal
model for displaying and maintaining access control information. Without a friendly and
expressive user interface, the usefulness of the access control objects would be greatly hindered.
This research aims at establishing an appropriate access control scheme for the transition of the
Process Handbook to a multi-user server. While protecting sensitive information stored in the
system is a major objective of the required access control policy, it is even more important that by
integrating the access control policy, users of the system can engage in new forms of collaboration,
and the system could provide new perspectives of the stored information. With the addition of the
new first-class entities, i.e., user groups and entity collections, together with the flexible access
control policy proposed and implemented in this research, these objectives can be met.
As discussed in Section 6.2, authentication and message exchanges layered on top of a secure
protocol provides adequate protection to the system in a distributed environment. Consequently,
access control can be executed with the faith that the user who requested the access represents the
actual user. Moreover, the fine granularity of control and the relaxation of management
requirements greatly enhance the flexibility of the system. As users are free to manipulate the
organization of user groups and entity collections, there are tremendous rooms for designing an
organization which satisfies a specific access control requirement and can be easily maintained.
The flexibility of the model to satisfy different combinations of access requirements allows
different forms of collaboration to be engaged among the users. Among the possible combinations,
many bear interesting implications. Furthermore, by combining the idea of version control and
incremental disclosure of information, an entity workspace can be established, and the system
would become an area of integrated workspaces. Finally, as entities can be organized into entity
collection hierarchy in addition to other existing relational hierarchies, the system provides an
addition dimension where users can view the entities. Such new perspective would be valuable to
many users.
As a summary, a reiteration of the outcome of this thesis would be in order. In this thesis, a
sensible access control policy, within the Process Handbook object API abstraction level, has been
identified and implemented. Moreover, extensions and rules relevant to the access control policy of
the server API are proposed. As a result of the research, users can benefit from an increase in the
ease of control over the design of process organization and relationship. While new forms of
collaboration are made possible, users can enjoy viewing the content of the Process Handbook
from new perspectives. Moreover, unexpected alterations of information stored in the system can
be reduced, and unauthorized access to the information can be guarded.
A.1 Specification of Access Control Manager Class
A.1.1 Properties
None.
A.1.2 Methods
GetUserPrivilege(MyUserGrouplD As Long, myEntitylD As Long, myACLType As Integer,
myStatus) As Integer
Function: This method returns the privilege of type myACLType for myEntityID of the user group
specified by myUserGroupID. If the identifiers are invalid, myStatus would be set to
error code PH_AC_ERRORINVALID_PARAMETER. Note: myACLType can be
PH_AC_ENTITY, PH_AC_DOMAIN, PH_AC_ENTITY_MANAGEMENT,
PH_ACDOMAIN_MANAGEMENT; PHACALL is not allowed
GetPrivilegedGroups(MyUserGrouplD As Long, myEntitylD As Long, myPrivilege As Integer,
ByRef myStatus)
Function: This method returns an array of group IDs whose authorization level is equal or greater
than myPrivilege for the user groups specified by myUserGrouplDs. This method
assumes that the myEntitylD are of type = PH_AC_ENTITY. If the identifiers are
invalid, myStatus would be set to error code
PH_AC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER. If the privileged group is empty, the first
element of the returned array will be negative.
InitNotify(myEntitylD As Long, myManagerlD As Variant, ByRef myStatus)
Requirement: myEntitylD must be valid, myManagerlD is an array of long numbers.
Modify: ACRelation Table
Function: Create the ACL corresponding to myEntitylD by adding the user groups with the
maxium privileges, specified by myManagerlD to the ACRelation table. If any of the
myMangerlD is invalid, myStatus will be set to error code
PH_AC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER.
CleanUpNotify(mylD As Long, myEntityType As Integer, ByRef myStatus)
Function: Remove all relations relevant to myID which is of type specified by myEntityType. If
any of the parameters are invalid, myStatus is set to error code
PH_AC_ERROR_INVALIDPARAMETER.
ChangeMemberNotify(myID As Long, myEntityType As Integer, ByRef myStatus)
Function: Remove all internal information related to the changed relation If any of the para meters
are invalid, myStatus is error code PH_AC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER.
A.2 Specification of ACL Class
A.2.1 Properties
Property Value Data Type Status
EntitylD Long Can be Read
ACLType Integer Can be Read
EOF Boolean Can be Read
A.2.2 Methods
Init(myEntitylD As Long, myACLType As Integer, myStatus)
Function: This method initializes the object by retrieving the corresonding ACL from the database.
If myEntitylD, myACLType invalid, then ACL is empty, and myStatus is set to error
code PH_AC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; else, the object is initialized. Finally,
if no groups has the maximum management right in the ACL,
PH_SYSTEM_MANAGER will be given such right.
GetFirstEntry(ByRef myStatus, mySessionlD as String) As ACLEntry
Function: This method returns the first ACLEntry object in the ACL object. If the ACL is not init,
myStatus will be set to error code PH_AC_ERROR_NOT_INIT, and GetFirstEntry will
be an uninitialized ACLEntry. If access privilege is not satisfied, or user not
authenticated, myStatus will be set to error code PH_AC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED.
If the ACL is empty, myStatus will be set to error code PH_AC_ERROR_EOF. Note: All
properties of an uninitialized ACLEntry will be negative.
GetNextEntry(ByRef myStatus, mySessionlD as String) As ACLEntry
Function: This method returns the next ACLEntry object in the ACL object. If the ACL is not
init, myStatus will be set to error code PH_AC_ERROR_NOT_INIT, and GetNextEntry
will be set to an uninitialized ACLEntry. If access privilege is not satisfied, or user not
authenticated, myStatus will be set to error code PH_AC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED
If ACL is empty or at the end already, myStatus will be set to error code
PH_AC_ERROR_EOF.
AddEntry(myEntry As ACLEntry, ByRef myStatus mySessionlD as String)
Modify: ACRelation Table
Function: This method updates the ACRelaion table of the handbook database to add the new
ACLEntry to the current object and other entities inheriting access control restrictions
from this object. If the ACL is not initialized, myStatus would be set to error code
PH_AC_ERROR_NOT_INIT; If any of the parameters are invalid, myStatus would be
set to error code PH_AC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER. If myUserGrouplD does
not have enough privilege, or user not authenticated, myStatus will be set to error code
PHACERRORACCESS DENIED.
RemoveEntry(myEntry As ACLEntry, ByRef myStatus mySessionlD as String)
Modify: ACRelation Table
Function: This method updates the ACRelaion table of the handbook database to remove myEntry
from the current object and other inherited access control restricitons. If any of the
parameters are invalid, myStatus would be set to error code
PHAC_ERROR_NOT_INIT. If myUserGroupID does not have enough privilege, or
user not authenticated, myStatus will be set to error code
PH_ACERROR_ACCESS_DENIED. After the entry is found and remove, the entry is
set to the first entry in the list.
Append(mySource As ACL, ByRef myStatus, mySessionID as String)
Modify: ACRelation Table
Function: This method updates the ACRelaion table of the handbook database to append the ACL
of mySource. If ACLs are not initialized, myStatus would be set to error code
PHACERROR_NOT_INIT. If myUserGroupID does not have the maximum
management right, myStatus will be set to error code
PHACERROR_ACCESS DENIED.
AddInherit(mySourcelD As Long, myStatus, mySessionlD as String)
Function: Create an access control inheritance relationship between mySource and the current
ojbect. If ACLs are not initialized, myStatus would be set to error code
PH_AC_ERROR_NOT_INIT. If myUserGrouplD does not have the maximum
management right, or user not authenticated, myStatus will be set to error code
PH_AC ERROR_ACCESS DENIED.
Removelnherit(mySourcelD As Long, myStatus, mySessionlD as String)
Function: Remove the access control inheritance relationship between mySource and the current
ojbect. If ACLs are not initialized, myStatus would be set to error code
PH_ACERROR_NOT_INIT. If myUserGrouplD does not have the maximum
management right, or user not authenticated, myStatus will be set to error code
PH AC ERROR ACCESS DENIED.
A.3 Specification of CapL Class
A.3.1 Properties
Property Value Data Type Status
UserGrouplD Long Can be Read
EOF Boolean Can be Read
A.3.2 Methods
Init(myEntitylD As Long, myStatus)
Function: This method initializes the object by retrieving the corresponding data from the
database. If myEntityID is invalid, then the object is empty, and myStatus is set to error
code PH_AC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER; else, the object is initialized.
GetFirstEntry(ByRef myStatus, mySessionlD as String) As CapLEntry
Function: This method returns the first CapLEntry object in the CapL object. If the CapL is not
init, myStatus will be set to error code PH_AC_ERROR_NOT_INIT, and GetFirstEntry
will be an uninitialized CapLEntry. If access privilege is not satisfied, or user not
authenticated, myStatus will be set to error code PH_AC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED.
If the CapL is empty, myStatus will be set to error code PH_AC_ERROR_EOF. Note:
All properties of an uninitialized CapLEntry will be negative.
GetNextEntry(ByRef myStatus, mySessionlD as String) As CapLEntry
Function: This method returns the next CapLEntry object in the CapL object. If the CapL is not
init, myStatus will be set to error code PH_AC_ERROR_NOT_INIT, and GetNextEntry
will be set to an uninitialized CapLEntry. If access privilege is not satisfied, or user not
authenticated, myStatus will be set to error code PH_AC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED
If CapL is empty or at the end already, myStatus will be set to error code
PH_AC_ERROREOF.
AddInherit (mySourceID As Long, myStatus mySessionID as String)
Function: Create an access control inheritance relationship between mySource and the current
object. If UserGrouplD does not have the maximum management right, or user not
authenticated, Status will be set to error code PH_AC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED. If
any of the parameters are invalid, or if the user group associated with the current object
is not a specialization of the user group represented by mySource, myStatus will be set to
error code PH_AC_ERRORINVALID_PARAMETER
RemoveInherit (mySourcelD As Long, myStatus mySessionID as String)
Function: Remove the access control inheritance relationship between mySource and the current
object. If UserGrouplD does not have the maximum management right, or user not
authenticated, Status will be set to error code PH_AC_ERROR_ACCESSDENIED. If
any of the parameters are invalid, or if the user group associated with the current object
is not a specialization of the user group represented by mySource, myStatus will be set to
error code PH_AC_ERRORINVALID_PARAMETER
A.4 Specification of ACLEntry Class
A.4.1 Properties
Property Value Data Type Status
UserGrouplD Long Can be Read and Updated
ACLType Integer Can be Read and Updated
Permission Integer Can be Read and Updated
A.4.2 Methods
None
A.5 Specification of CapLEntry Class
A.5.1 Properties
Property
EntitylD
ACLType
Permission
I Value Data Type
Long
Integer
Integer
Status
Can be Read and Updated
Can be Read and Updated
Can be Read and Updated
A.5.2 Methods
None
A.6 Specification of MD5Msg Class
A.6.1 Properties
Property Value Data Type Status
NumByte Integer Can be Read and Updated
MsgByte Byte Can be Read and Updated
A.6.2 Methods
Init(NumByte As Integer)
Function: Reallocate dynamic array to size NumByte
CreateCopyo As MD5Msg
Function: Copy the content of the Object to a new MD5Msg Object
ShiftL(n As Integer)
Function: Shift the Object to Left by n bit
ShiftR(n As Integer)
Function: Shift the Object to right by n bit
RotL(n As Integer)
Function: Rotate the Object to Left by n bit
RottR(n As Integer)
Function: Rotate the Object to right by n bit
Copy(mySource As MD5Msg)
Function: Copy the content of mySource to the Object
T -
MSB() As Integer
Return the location of MSB in the fixed size byte chunks starting from 1
Negate d_byte of the Object
Equal(myMsg As MD5Msg) As Boolean
Function: Return True if myMsg is identical to the object
A.7 Specification of MD5Engine Class
A.7.1 Properties
Property Value Data Type Status
NumByte Integer Can be Read and Updated
MsgByte Byte Can be Read and Updated
A.7.2 Methods
Str2MD5Msg(myStr As String) As MD5Msg
Requirement:
Function:
Length(myStr) <= 64 characters
Convert a string a MD5Msg of 64 byte chunks. If myStr is empty or more than 64
characters then return a MD5Msg containing 0.
MD5Msg2Str(myMsg As MD5Msg) As String
Function: Convert myMsg into a string
Hash(myInput As MD5Msg) As MD5Msg
Requirement:
Function:
myInput must have 64 byte chunks, and have less than 448 bits.
Pad myInput to 448 bits and then append 64 LSB of myInput to form 512 bit message.
Transform the message in 4 rounds, and return the result.
A.8 Specification of AuthMgr Class
A.8.1 Properties
None
A.8.2 Methods
Authenticate(mySessionID as String) as Long
Function:
Negate()
Function:
Function: Check the parameters against the record stored in the object. If equal, the function
return the user group id of the corresponding user group, else -1 is returned.
CreateSession (myUserGrouplD as Long, myPassword as String, myStatus) as Long
Function: Hashes the password using MD5 and compare to the one stored in the database for user
group, myUserGrouplD. If equal, return a session object, and maintain it in a collection
object; else, myStatus is set to be an error with code number
PH_AC_ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAIL, and the returned object will be pointed
to NOTHING.
CloseSession(mySessionlD as String, Status)
Function: Remove the session object that corresponds to the parameters. If such object does not
exist, Status will be set to an error with code number
PHAC_ERROR_OBJ_NOT_EXIST. Otherwise, the object will be removed from the
collection.
CloseAllSessions()
Function: Remove all the session objects maintained in the object.
A.9 Specification of Session Class
A.5.1 Properties
Property IValue Data Type Status
SessionlD String Can be Read and Updated
DateTime Date Can be Read and Updated
A.5.2 Methods
None
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B.2 Error Codes
Error Description Value
Invalid Parameter PH_AC_ERROR_INVALIDPARAMETER
Not Initialized PH_AC_ERROR_NOTINIT
Access Denied PH_ACERROR_ACCESS_DENIED
End of File/Record Encountered PH_AC_ERROREOF
Object not Found PH_AC_ERROR_OBJ_NOTEXIST
Authentication Fail PH_AC_ERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAIL
B.3 Other Global Constants
Variable Description Value
Entity ID of Entity Universe PH_ENTITY_UNIVERSE
Entity ID of User Universe PH_USER_UNIVERSE
Entity ID of System Manager User Group PH_SYSTEMMANAGER
Type ID for User Groups PH_AC_USERGROUP
Type ID for Entity Collections PH_AC_ENTITY_COLLECTION
Type ID for Other First-class Entities PH_AC_NORMAL_ENTITY
Privilege Constant
~
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PH_AC_READ_PRIVILEGE
PH_AC_CREATE_PRIVILEGE
PH_AC_ADD_RELATION_PRIVILEGE
PH_AC_REMOVE_RELATIONPRIVILEGE
PHACEDIT_PRIVILEGE
PH_AC_MOVE_PRIVILEGE
PHAC_DELETE_PRIVILEGE
PH_AC_READPRIVILEGE - PH_AC_MANAGEMENT_PRIVILEGE_OFFSET
PHAC_READ_PRIVILEGE + PH_AC_MANAGEMENT_PRIVILEGE_OFFSET
PH_AC_CREATE_PRIVILEGE - PH_AC MANAGEMENT_PRIVILEGE OFFSET
PHAC_CREATE_PRIVILEGE + PHACMANAGEMENT_PRIVILEGE_OFFSET
PHAC_ADD_RELATION_PRIVILEGE 
- PHAC MANAGEMENTPRIVILEGEOFFSET
PHAC_ADD_RELATION_PRIVILEGE + PH_AC_MANAGEMENT_PRIVILEGE OFFSET
PHAC_REMOVE_RELATION_PRIVILEGE 
- PH_AC_MANAGEMENT_PRIVILEGE OFFSET
PH_AC_REMOVE_RELATION_PRIVILEGE + PH_AC_MANAGEMENT_PRIVILEGE OFFSET
PH_AC_EDIT_PRIVILEGE - PHACMANAGEMENT_PRIVILEGE OFFSET
PH_AC_EDIT_PRIVILEGE + PH_AC_MANAGEMENT_PRIVILEGEOFFSET
PH_AC_MOVE_PRIVILEGE - PH_AC_MANAGEMENTPRIVILEGE_OFFSET
PH_AC_MOVE_PRIVILEGE + PH_ACMANAGEMENT_PRIVILEGE_OFFSET
PH_AC_DELETE_PRIVILEGE - PH_AC_MANAGEMENT_PRIVILEGE_OFFSET
PH_AC_DELETE PRIVILEGE + PH_AC_MANAGEMENT_PRIVILEGE OFFSET
Privilege Constant
C.1 Integration of Access Control Mechanism
C.1.1 Parameter Specification
EntityObject.MethodName(OwnParameters, ACParameters)
Where:
EntityObject refers to an instance of the Entity class;
MethodName refers to a method of the Entity class;
OwnParameters refers to the non-access control parameters required;
ACParameters refers to the access control parameters required. It consists of the session identifier of
the exported session object.
EntityObject.MethodName(OwnParameters, SessionlD as String)
Where:
SessionlD refers to the session identifier in the session object exported to the user;
C.1.2 Access Control Procedures
C.1.2.1 Authentication Specification
In each method of the Entity class, it has to perform user authentication, the specification for the
authentication mechanism is shown below:
Specification:
AuthMgrObj.Authenticate(SessionlD) as Long
Function: Check the parameters against the record stored in the object. If equal, the function return
the user group id of the corresponding user group, else -1 is returned.
Usage:
If AuthMgrObj.CheckAuth(SessionlD) = -1Then
....Authentication Fail
End If
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Where:
AuthMgrObj refers to an instance of the AuthMgr class;
SessionlD refers to the session identifier in the session object exported to the user;
C.1.2.2 Access Checking Specification
In addition to authentication checking, each method of the Entity class checks the privileges
possessed by the authenticated user. The specification of the access checking mechanism is shown
below:
Specification:
ACMgrObj.GetPrivilege(UserGrouplD, EntitylD, ACLType, Status) as Integer
Function: This method returns the privilege of type ACLType for EntitylD of the user group
specified by UserGrouplD. If the identifiers are invalid, Status would be set to be an eror with code
number PH_AC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER. Note: ACLType can be PH_AC_ENTITY,
PH_AC_DOMAIN, PH_AC_ENTITY_MANAGEMENT, PH_AC_DOMAIN_MANAGEMENT;
PH_AC_ALL is not allowed
Usage:
If ACMgrObj.GetPrivilege(UserGrouplD, EntitylD, ACLType, Status) < RequiredPrivilege Then
....Access Denied
End If
Where:
ACMgrObj refers to an instance of the ACMgr class;
UserGrouplD refers to the user group identifier of the authenticated user;
EntitylD refers to the entity identifier of the entity requesting access checking.
ACLType refers to the type of the access control relation. ACLType can be PH_AC_ENTITY,
PH_AC_DOMAIN, PH_AC_ENTITY_MANAGEMENT, or PH_ACDOMAIN_MANAGEMENT
RequiredPrivilege refers to the minimum privilege required for executing the method, as identified
below.
Status stores any error occurred during access checking. If any of the identifiers are invalid, status
will be an error with code number PH_AC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER.
C.1.3 Initialization
C.1.3.1 Initializing Session Objects for Authentication
Users are given a session object when they log onto the system. The specification for the creation
of session objects is given below:
Specification:
AuthMgrObj.CreateSession(UserGrouplD, Password, Status) as Session
Function: Hashes the password using MD5 and compare to the one stored in the database for user
group, UserGrouplD. If equal, return a session object, and maintain it in a collection object; else,
Status is set to be an error with code number PH_ACERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAIL, and the
returned object will be pointed to NOTHING.
Usage:
Set mySessionObj = AuthMgrObj.CreateSession(UserGrouplD, Password, Status)
Where:
mySessionObj refers to the variable which would be assigned the new Session object.
AuthMgrObj refers to an instance of the AuthMgr class;
UserGrouplD refers to the user group identifier of the user;
Password refers to the password for the user group;
Status stores any error occurred during the creation of the session object. If the password does not
correspond to that of the user group specified by UserGrouplD, status will be an error with code
number PHACERROR_AUTHENTICATION_FAIL.
C.1.3.2 Initializing Users with Maximum Management Privilege
When a new entity is created, users with the maximum management privilege can be assigned
through the InitNotify method of the ACMgr class. The specification of the InitNotify method is
shown below:
Specification:
ACMgrObj.InitNotify (EntitylD, ManagerlD, Status)
Require: EntitylD must be valid, ManagerlD is an array of long numbers.
Modify. ACRelation Table
Function: Create the ACL corresponding to EntitylD by adding the user groups with the maximum
privileges, specified by ManagerlD to the ACRelation table. If any of the MangerlD is invalid, Status
will be set to an error with code number PH_AC_ERRORINVALID_PARAMETER.
Usage:
ACMgrObj.InitNotify EntitylD, ManagerlD, Status
Where:
ACMgrObj refers to an instance of the ACMgr class;
UserGrouplD refers to the user group identifier of the authenticated user;
ManagerID refers to an array of identifiers, representing the users to be assigned the maximum
management privilege.
EntitylD refers to the entity identifier of the entity to be initialized;
Status stores any error occurred during access checking. If any of the identifiers are invalid, status
will be an error with code number PH_AC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER.
C.1.3.3 Initializing Entity to Inherit Access Control Restrictions
An entity can inherit a specific type of access control restrictions from another entity if both the
source entity and the destination entity support the type. The specification of the access control
restrictions inheritance mechanism is shown below:
Specification:
ACLObj.AddInherit (SourceEntitylD, ACLType, Status, SessionlD)
Function: Create an access control inheritance relationship between SourceEntitylD and the current
object. If the object is not initialized, Status would be set to error code PH_AC_ERROR_NOT_INIT.
If the corresponding user group of the session does not have the maximum management right, or user
not authenticated, Status will be set to error code PH_AC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED. If any of the
parameters are invalid, Status will be set to error code PH_AC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
Note: if the current object is of type PH_AC_ALL,ACLType can be PH_AC_ALL, PH_AC_ENTITY,
PH_AC_DOMAIN, PH_AC_ENTITY_MANAGEMENT, and PH_AC_DOMAIN_MANAGEMENT.
Otherwise, ACLType must be the same as the type of the object.
Usage:
ACLObj.AddInherit SourceEntitylD, Status, SessionlD
Where:
ACLObj refers to an instance of the ACL class;
SourceEntitylD refers to the entity identifier of the parent entity;
ACLType refers to the type of access control relations. It can be PH_AC_ALL, PH_AC_ENTITY,
PH_AC_DOMAIN, PH_AC_ENTITY_MANAGEMENT, or PH_AC_DOMAIN_MANAGEMENT
Status stores any error occurred during access checking. If any of the identifiers are invalid, status
will be an error with code number PH_AC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER. If the user group
specified by UserGrouplD does not have the privilege to inherit access control restrictions, Status will
be an error with code number PH_AC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED.
SessionlD refers to the session identifier in the session object exported to the user;
C.1.3.4 Initializing User Group to Inherit Privileges in Specialization
A user group can inherit the privileges given to its parent in the specialization hierarchy. The
specification of the privilege inheritance mechanism is shown below:
Specification:
CapLObj. AddInherit (SourceEntitylD, Status, SessionlD)
Function: Create an access control inheritance relationship between SourceEntitylD and the
current object.. If any of the parameters are invalid, or if the associated user group of the current
object is not a specialization of the user group represented by SourceEntitylD, Status will be set to an
error with code number PH_ACERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER. If the corresponding user group
of the session does not have the maximum management right, or user not authenticated, Status will be
set to error code PH_AC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED.
Usage:
CapLObj.AddInherit SourceEntitylD, Status, SessionlD
Where:
CapLObj refers to an instance of the CapL class;
SourceEntitylD refers to the entity identifier of the parent entity;
Status stores any error occurred during access checking. If any of the identifiers are invalid, Status
will be an error with code number PH_AC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER.
SessionlD refers to the session identifier in the session object exported to the user;
C.1.4 Clean Up
C.1.4.1 Entity Removal
When an entity is being removed from the system, a RemoveNotify message should be sent to an
ACMgr object. The specification is shown below:
Specification:
ACMgrObj. RemoveNotify (EntitylD, EntityType, Status)
Function: Remove all relations relevant to EntitylD which is of type specified byEntityType. If any
of the parameters are invalid, Status will be set to an error, with code number
PH_AC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER.
Usage:
ACMgrObj.RemoveNotify EntitylD, EntityType, Status
Where:
ACMgrObj refers to an instance of the ACMgr class;
EntitylD refers to the entity identifier of the entity being removed;
EntityType refers to the entity type of the entity being removed; If entity represents a user group,
EntityType is PH_AC_USERGROUP; if entity represents an entity collection, EntityType is
PH_AC_ENTITY_COLLECTION; otherwise, EntityType is PH_AC_NORMAL_ENTITY.
Status stores any error occurred during access checking. If any of the identifiers are invalid, Status
will be an error with code number PH_AC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER.
C.1.4.2 Membership Change
When a membership relation is being added or removed, a ChangeMemberNotify message should
be sent to an ACMgr object. The specification is shown below:
Specification:
ACMgrObj. ChangeMemberNotify (EntitylD, EntityType, Status)
Function: Remove all relations relevant to EntitylD which is of type specified byEntityType. If any
of the parameters are invalid, Status will be set to an error with code number
PH_AC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER.
Usage:
ACMgrObj. ChangeMemberNotify EntitylD, EntityType, Status
Where:
ACMgrObj refers to an instance of the ACMgr class;
EntitylD refers to the entity identifier of the child entity of the membership relation being removed;
EntityType refers to the entity type of the entity being removed; If entity represents a user group,
EntityType is PH_AC_USER_GROUP; if entity represents an entity collection, EntityType is
PH_AC_ENTITY_COLLECTION; otherwise, EntityType is PH_AC_NORMAL_ENTITY.
Status stores any error occurred during access checking. If any of the identifiers are invalid, Status
will be an error with code number PH_AC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER.
C.1.4.3 User Log Out
When a user logs out of the system, the session object associated with the session should also be
removed from memory. The specification for the cleanup process is given below:
Specification:
AuthMgrObj.CloseSession(SessionlD, Status)
Function: Remove the session object that corresponds to the parameters. If such object does not
exist, Status will be set to an error with code number PH_AC_ERROR_OBJ_NOT_EXIST.
Otherwise, the object will be removed from the collection.
AuthMgrObj.CloseAllSessions( )
Function: Remove all the session objects maintained by the object.
Usage:
AuthMgrObj.CloseSession SessionlD, Status
AuthMgrObj.CloseAllSessions
Where:
AuthMgrObj refers to an instance of the AuthMgr class;
SessionlD refers to the session identifier in the session object exported to the user;
Status stores any error occurred during the removal of the session object. If the object does not exist,
Status will be an error with code number PHAC_ERROR_OBJNOT_EXIST.
C.1.4.4 Removal of Inheritance Relations
Inheritance relations can be removed by calling the appropriate procedures. The specification of
removing inheritance relations are shown below.
Specification:
Obj. RemoveInherit (SourceEntitylD, Status, SessionlD)
Function: Remove the Inherited given to the user group, SourceEntitylD, and other relevant
objects. If any of the parameters are invalid, or if the associated user group of the current object is not
a specialization of the user group represented by SourceEntitylD, Status will be set to an error with
code number PH_AC_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER. If the corresponding user group of the
session does not have the maximum management right, or user not authenticated, Status will be set to
error code PH_AC_ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED.
Usage:
Obj.Removelnherit SourceEntitylD, Status, SessionlD
Where:
Obj refers to an instance of the CapL or ACL class;
SourceEntitylD refers to the entity identifier of the parent entity;
Status stores any error occurred during access checking. If any of the identifiers are invalid, Status
will be an error with code number PHACERRORINVALIDPARAMETER.
SessionlD refers to the session identifier in the session object exported to the user;
D.1 Usage Scenario for the Process Handbook
In the evaluation of the access control policy, a preliminary Process Handbook editorial
methodology has been established. In particular, roles for the normal access of the entities have
been defined, and each role owns a different set of entity access control privileges. In Figure 18,
the different roles and their corresponding responsibilities are presented. While the "User" role has
the least responsibility, the "Administrator" role has the most. As an interesting note, whereas
each entry in the Handbook may have a different author, many related entries would be monitored
by the same editors. In addition, the area of access of the entries in the Handbook can be divided
into "Public", "Own", "Group", and "All". Specifically, the "Public" area would contain only the
entries readable by the general, and the "All" area would contain all entries exist in the Handbook.
Furthermore, while the entries in the "Own" area would be maintained by a single user, the entries
in the "Group" area would be maintained by a group of users. Users allowed to access the more
restrictive areas, such as the "All" area, would also be allowed to access the more public areas,
such as the "Public" area,.
Increase in Power implied by Roles
Figure 18: Decomposition of Roles. The parentheses in each box contain the responsibilities of the
corresponding role.
Orthogonal to the concept of roles and areas of access is the idea of review status. When the status
of the entries changes, the privileges given to each role also alter. As shown in Table 2, when the
status of an entry is "draft", users in the "Author" role are allowed to change the entry whereas
users in the "Editor" role are not.
Table 2: Impact of Review Status on Role Responsibilities. Writing corresponds to reading, editing,
and classifying entries.
Draft Review Registered
User None None Read
Reviewer None Read Read
Author Write Read Read
Editor Read Write Write
D.2 Using the Access Control Policy
By making use of entity collections and their interrelationship, the editorial methodology described
in the preceding section can be supported. In particular, the various areas of access would directly
map to various entity collections. As a result, all public entries would be members of the "Public"
entity collection. Moreover, while all entries maintained by a single user would be members of the
"Own" collection, all entries maintained by a group of users would be members of the "Group"
collection. Finally, the "All" collection will map to the "All" area, containing all relevant entries in
the Handbook as members.
In the given scenario, users allowed to access the members of more restrictive areas are also
allowed to access the members of more public areas. To satisfy the above requirement, one can
make use of the membership relation among entity collections 32. By making a public collection the
member of a more restrictive collection, domain access control restrictions specified in the
restrictive collection would also be applicable to the public one. Thus, users who are given the
read privilege in the domain of the most restrictive collection, i.e., the "All collection", could read
any entities in the system33. Following this strategy, the "Public" collection should be a member of
the "Own" collection. Moreover, the "Own" collection should be a member of the "Group"
collection, which in turn should be a member of the "All" collection.
32 Recall that domain access control restrictions of an entity collection applies to its members.
33 The "All" collection is the most restrictive collection, and the "Public" collection is the most public
collection. Moreover, the "Own" collection is more public than the "Group" collection.
On the other hand, to support the ability to change user privileges according to review status, each
of the preliminary collections defined should be subdivided so that each of the new collections
would contain entries of a particular review status. As a result, by designating different domain
access restrictions to collections containing entries with different review status, the privileges given
to users of different roles can be updated when the status of an entry changes, i.e., when the entry
is moved from one collection to another.
In addition, because senior authors are allowed to edit the content of bundles while junior authors
are not allowed, the organization of the entity collection has to be further modified by separating
activities from bundles. The final organizatioA4 of the entity collection is shown inFigure 19.
Figure 19: Membership Relation among Entity Collections. An arrow represents a membership
relation. For viewing convenience, "Entity Universe" is not shown.
34 When a specialization is created in a particular entity collection, the access control inheritance
mechanism will automatically grant the appropriate membership relations to the new entity. In this way,
the domain access control relations in each entity collection will be applicable to any new entries.
To allow different roles to possess different responsibilities, each role is mapped to a different set
of access privileges. However, the distinction between syntactic and semantic editing is not
supported by the proposed access control policy. Otherwise, the complexity of the access control
model will increase drastically, as the privilege levels could no longer form an ordered list. As a
result, instead of using the proposed model, the distinction will be made through social means. In
other words, junior editors would be trusted to act appropriately and not to modify the
decomposition of the entries. InTable 3, the mapping between user roles and privileges is shown.
Finally, changing review status as well as placing bundles and activities into the appropriate
collections have to be done manually by changing the members of the entity collections. In
particular, the designated users would have the revoke delete privilege and the remove relation
privilege in the relevant entity collections. For example, to manage the members of the "Public"
area, the designated managers should have the revoke delete privilege and the remove relation
privilege in the domain of the "Public" collection.
On the other hand, access control privileges can be maintained in two ways. In one way, the
responsible users would be given the revoke delete privilege in the relevant domain to perform
access control management. Alternatively, one could also make use of user groups to facilitate the
maintenance of access control restrictions. In this way, the domain privileges for a particular user
role in a given entity collection would be granted to a fixed user group. For example, the privileges
for the "Editor" role in the "Public Draft" domain is only given to the "Public Draft Editor" user
group. Through adding and removing members in the "Public Draft Editor" user group, the
authorized editors in the "Public Draft" domain can be specified.
Table 3: Mapping between Roles, Review Status, and Privileges.
Review Status Roles Privilege Requirements
Draft User No Privilege in Draft Domain
In-Review User No Privilege in In-Review Domain
Registered User Read Privilege in Registered Domain
Draft Reviewer No Privilege in Draft Domain
In-Review Reviewer Read Privilege in In-Review Domain
Registered Reviewer Read Privilege in Registered Domain
Draft Junior Author Delete Privilege in Draft Activities Domain
In-Review Junior Author Read Privilege in In-Review Domain
Registered Junior Author Read Privilege in Registered Domain
Draft Senior Author Delete Privilege in Draft Domain
In-Review Senior Author Read Privilege in In-Review Domain
Registered Senior Author Read Privilege in Registered Domain
Draft Editor Read Privilege in Draft Domain
In-Review Editor Delete Privilege in In-Review Domain
Registered Editor Delete Privilege in Registered Domain
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